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PREFACE
We must avoid the threat of anarchy in ocean space.
The civilized nations would look foolish indeed if this
last, vast physical frontier should become a sort of
watery wild west where the exploiter with the biggest
"sea shooter" could become "king of the seamount" at the
expense of legitimate commercial or scientific activity
by others.
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The term "emerging uses," as used in this thesis,
refers to those uses of the ocean floor which are totally
unassociated with the exploration for and exploitation of
the natural resources. Virtually all the existing inter-
national and municipal legislation concerning the juridical
status of the ocean floor has been primarily directed towards
the extraction of wealth from the ocean floor, and little
attention, even in the writings of jurists, has been given to
the problem of claims to jurisdiction and control over areas
of the ocean floor for purposes other than the exploration
and exploitation of natural resources. It is now becoming
painfully clear that the same technology which has enabled
man to exploit the riches of the ocean floor has also made
possible many new uses of the ocean floor totally unassociated
with the extraction of wealth. Unfortunately, this over-
emphasis on the wealth value has led the coastal states and
the world community in general to ignore the emerging uses.
This thesis maintains that the emerging uses will be
an important factor in the final determination of the nature

and extent of the coastal state's authority over the
continental shelf, in the delimitation of the area of ex-
clusive coastal authority, and in the problem of balancing
the exclusive interests of the coastal state with the in-
clusive interests of the world community.
At the present time the Convention on the Continental
Shelf only recognizes the right of the coastal state to ex-
plore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural
resources. Yet within the past few years the impact of the
emerging uses on important coastal interests, both because of
the nature of the activities and their propinquity to the
coastal state, has resulted in the coastal state assuming
jurisdiction and control over them, and there is a danger
that the coastal state may feel compelled to extend its juris-
diction seaward to protect important coastal interests.
It seems certain that the emerging uses are going to
cause some interference with the more traditional uses of
ocean space, and there is a danger that decision -makers may
irrationally attempt to foreclose any new use of ocean space
by automatically applying inherited prescriptions under a
rigid conception of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas.
Such an attempt to limit the uses of ocean space is not in
the common interest of the world community, and might well
lead to eventual conflict which could destroy the existing

public order of the oceans. Instead, the decision -maker
must seek to accomodate these emerging uses, and, when they
conflict with the more traditional uses of ocean space, he
must weigh and balance all factors relevant to the particular
controversy in the context of the fundamental policies of the
public order of the oceans, in order to arrive at a priority
among the competing interests. This paper will attempt to
provide the decision-maker with a methodology which will aid
him in this important and complex task.
The relative newness of the doctrine of the continental
shelf has left many problems unresolved. While it is main-
tained that the emerging uses will be an important factor in
the solution of these problems, the complexity of the pro-
blems and the numerous factors relevant to their solution
require that we treat the emerging uses in the total context
of the doctrine and not in a vacuum. Only then can we truly
understand the real impact of the emerging uses on the
doctrine of the continental shelf.
Unfortunately, both time and space prohibit more than
a brief discussion of the impact of the emerging uses on
other aspects of the law of the sea. It is hoped, however,
that the methodology provided for the accomodation of the
emerging uses under the doctrine of the continental shelf will

be equally applicable for the accomodation of these emerging
uses under all aspects of the law of the sea.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Historic Claims to Exclusive Authority
over Submarine Areas beneath the
High Seas
It is a well established rule of customary international
law that the sovereignty of the coastal state over its internal
waters and territorial sea extends downward into the subsoil
and seabed beneath them. 2 Because of the lack of existing
technology there was little interest in the juridical status
of the ocean floor beyond the limits of the territorial sea.
Occasionally claims were made to exclusive control
over sedentary fisheries beneath the high seas, such as the
nineteenth century claims of England to ownership of pearl and
chank fisheries off the coasts of Ceylon and Bahrein, but
these claims were based upon their historic nature and offer
little precedent for claims to vast areas of the ocean floor.
There were also instances of coastal states extracting
minerals from beneath the bed of the high seas by means of
tunneling from the mainland or islands within the territorial
seas, but since these activities were begun from within the
territory of the coastal state and conducted entirely beneath
the bed of the high seas, coastal state control over these

activities was guaranteed and there was no possibility of
conflict with the traditional uses of the high seas -3
B. The Juridical Regime of the
Continental Shelf
It was not until the middle of this century, when
modern technology placed the rich offshore oil deposits with-
in reach, that the coastal states suddenly became interested
in the juridical status of the adjacent submarine areas lying
beyond the traditional limits of coastal authority- The
first real instance of a state laying claim to a vast area of
the ocean floor occurred in 1942, when Great Britain and
Venezuela divided between themselves the subsoil and seabed
of the Gulf of Paria which lay outside the territorial waters
of either state. While the Treaty of Paria is an important
precedent, it did not represent a policy of either state with
regard to submarine areas in general, nor did it give rise to
similar claims by other states. It was not until some three
years later, in 1945, when President Truman issued his now
famous Proclamation regarding the natural resources of the
continental shelf contiguous to the United States,-* that
other states made "similar" claims and the doctrine of the
continental shelf became an important concept of international
law.
Within five years some thirty states had made some
type of claim to jurisdiction and control over adjacent

submarine areas. Many of these proclamations, particularly
those of some of the Latin American countries who sought to
gain exclusive control over fisheries, made far more compre-
hensive claims to these submarine areas than did the Truman
Proclamation, and amounted to claims of "sovereignty" over
the continental shelf and the superjacent waters.
In 1949 the International Law Commission began a study
to codify the law of the sea , and it was agreed that the work
would include the regime of the continental shelf. in the
Commission's 1956 Report to the General Assembly it was
recommended that the United Nations convene an international
conference on the law of the sea.° The Eleventh General
Assembly approved the recommendation, ° and the Conference on
the Law of the Sea was held at Geneva, Switzerland, from
February 24 to April 27, 1958.
The Conference was attended by the representatives of
eighty-six nations and produced four seperate convent ions on
the law of the sea, one of which was the Convention on the
Continental Shelf^ (hereinafter referred to as the Shelf
Convention)
. At the present time only thirty-nine states have
ratified the Shelf Convention, but at least 107 nations now
recognize the principle of exclusive coastal authority over
the mineral resources of the adjacent submarine areas, -*- and
the lack of protests with regard to the unilateral claims to

8exclusive authority over the mineral resources of the
continental shelf has led most jurists to regard the principle
as a customary rule of international law. 12
The Shelf Convention was far from successful in
resolving all the problems related to the doctrine of the
continental shelf. While it rejected the claims to juris-
diction and control over the superjacent waters and airspace,
it only considered the right of the coastal state to explore
the continental shelf and to exploit its natural resources,
and did not consider what rights, if any, the coastal state
has to use the shelf for other purposes. Since it had only
considered the right of the coastal state to explore the
shelf and exploit its natural resources, these were the only
rights which the Shelf Convention sought to accomodate with
the more traditional uses of ocean space. Finally, the Shelf
Convention only vaguely delimited the area of exclusive
authority under the mistaken belief that this would not pre-
sent any problem in the immediate future. Yet dispite all
its faults, the Shelf Convention, together with the work of
the Conference and the International Law Commission, provide
an excellent source for examining the doctrine of the continen-
tal shelf.

II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF
COASTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
A. Unilateral Claims to Authority over
the Continental Shelf
The Truman Proclamation was a limited claim to
"jurisdiction and control" over the "natural resources" of
the continental shelf, and specifically provided that the
claim in no way affected the status of the superjacent waters
as high seas. While the Proclamation did not define the term
"natural resources," the references to "petroleum and other
minerals," and "pool or deposit," can leave little doubt
that the claim was to the mineral resources of the subsoil
and seabed, and not to the living resources of the superjacent
waters. 13 This position is further strengthened by the fact
that a second Proclamation was issued on the same day dealing
with the policy of the United States with respect to coastal
fisheries in certain areas of the high seas contiguous to
the United States. 14
Other unilateral instruments, however, did not limit
the claim to jurisdiction and control over the natural
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resources of the continental shelf, but instead claimed
"sovereignty" over the subsoil. and seabed itself. 15 Many
writers could see little difference between claims to author-
ity over the natural resources and claims to sovereignty over
the subsoil and seabed. 16 These writers apparently were un-
able to foresee any use of the continental shelf which would
not involve rights to the natural resources. As one writer
commented:
It is difficult to see what distinction there is
between control over "natural resources" and control
over the subsoil and sea bed themselves. Anything of
value might be included in "natural resources," and any
use or interference with the subsoil and sea bed might
equally be regarded as a use of or interference with
their "natural resources ." 17
Most of the American and British writers who argued
that there was no real distinction between claims to juris-
diction and control over the natural resources and claims to
sovereignty over the subsoil and seabed did not see any pro-
blem with the doctrine of usque ad coelum .18 Professor
Lauterpacht pointed out that sovereignty .can be limited by
other principles of international law, and that the sov-
ereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea is not
incompatable with the inclusive right of innocent passage.
Thus the sovereignty of the coastal state over its continental




Many of the Latin American nations, however, did use
the theory of sovereignty as a basis for claiming jurisdiction
and control over the resources of the superjacent waters.
Under the theory of "contiguity" they argued that the continen-
tal shelf was a natural prolongation of the land mass, and as
such, was an integral part of the territory of the coastal
state. This meant that the shelf belonged to the coastal
state ipso jure , and the proclamations were issued merely to
"confirm" this right. 21 The Latin American states also argued
that the United States' Proclamation on coastal fisheries
had recognized the exclusive right of the coastal state to
jurisdiction and control over the living resources of the
epicontinental sea. 2 This was, however, a deliberate mis-
reading of the instrument. The Proclamation establishing
conservation zones over fisheries in certain areas of the high
seas contiguous to the United States applied only to those
fisheries which were operated exclusively by nationals of the
United States. Where the fisheries were operated by nationals
of other states exclusively or jointly with United States
nationals, the conservation zones were to be established by
joint agreement with the other states involved. Thus the Pro-
clamation was not a claim to sovereignty over an area of the




It is not too surprising that some of the Latin
American nations made claims to exclusive authority over the
living resources of the superjacent waters. The continental
shelf is very narrow along the entire Pacific coast of South
America, and the technologically underdeveloped nations of
Euatin America could derive little economic benefit from the
recognition of exclusive authority over mineral resources.
Exclusive control over fisheries, on the other hand, would
yield substantial economic returns from the control and
licensing of foreign fishing vessels.
It is interesting to note that the United States and
other nations sent protests to those nations claiming juris-
diction over the superjacent waters, J but that no protests
were made to those nations claiming sovereignty only over the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf. Thus it would
seem that the protests were not objections to the nature and
extent of the authority claimed over the subsoil and seabed,
but rather were objections to claims of authority over the
superjacent waters which are a part of the high seas. As will
be shown later, the objection to the use of the terms
"sovereignty" and "sovereign rights" at the 1958 Conference
was not so much a disagreement as to the nature and extent of
the authority claimed over the subtoil and seabed itself, as
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it was a fear that the use of the terms might give rise to
claims to authority over the superjacent waters.
B. History of Article Two of
the Shelf Convention
The first draft articles of the International Law
Commission, adopted in 195 1, defined the rights of the coastal
state over the continental shelf as "jurisdiction and control
for the purposes of exploring it and exploiting^ its natural
resources.' In the commentary on Article 2, the Commission
explained that the authority of the coastal state over the
continental shelf was "solely for the purpose stated," and
that it had avoided the use of the term "sovereignty" because
the right of the coastal state to explore and exploit the
resources of the shelf "cannot be placed on the same footing
as the general powers exercised by a State over its territory
and territorial waters." 2 '
In 1953, the Commission changed the wording of draft
Article 2 to read: "The coastal state exercises over the
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of ex-
ploring and exploiting its natural resources." 2 ^ The Com-
mission made it clear, however, that the wording in no way
29affected the status of the superjacent water or airspace.
During the International Law Commission's final draft
of the articles on the law of the sea, in 1956, the
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1953 draft Article 2 became draft Article 68, but the wording
of the article was unchanged. In the commentary on draft
Article 68, the Commission again made clear its meaning of
the term "sovereign rights:"
The Commission desired to avoid language lending
itself to interpretations alien to an object which
the Commission considers to be of decisive importance,
namely, the safeguarding of the principle of the full
freedom of the superjacent sea and the air space above
it. Hence it was unwilling to accept the sovereignty
of the coastal State over the seabed and subsoil of
the continental shelf. On the other hand, the text as
now adopted leaves no doubt that the rights conferred
upon the coastal State cover all rights necessary for
and connected with the exploration and exploitation of
the natural resources of the continental shelf.
At the Conference of the Law of the Sea, Article 68
was the subject of considerable debate in the Fourth
Committee which was assigned the topic of the continental
shelf. A number of states sought to convince the Committee
to recognize the coastal state's sovereignty over its conti-
nental shelf, but a study of the summary records of the debate
on this issue can leave little doubt that the real motive
behind the move was an attempt to gain control over the
resources of the superjacent waters.^ Likewise, much of the
opposition against the use of such terms as "sovereignty"
and "sovereign rights" was a fear that these terms might be
used as a basis for claiming jurisdiction over the superja-
cent waters and airspace. 2 Because of this fear, the United
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States introduced a proposal to substitute the words
"exclusive rights" for the Commission's term "sovereign
rights" in draft Article 68. The Committee adopted the
United States' proposal by a narrow vote of 21 to 20, with
27 abstentions . 33 Later, however, at the Plenary Session,
after it had become clear that the term used to define the
coastal state's authority over the continental shelf would
have no affect on the status of the superjacent waters and
airspace, the United States voted for the return of the
term "sovereign rights," which was adopted by a vote of 51
to 14 with 6 abstentions . 34 Thus, Article 2 paragraph 1 of
the Shelf Convention defined the rights of the coastal state
over the continental shelf as "sovereign rights for the pur-
pose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."
After considerable debate, the "natural resources"
were defined in Article 2 paragraph 4 as "mineral and other
non-living resources" and sedentary species of living organ-
isms "which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile
. . . or are unable to move except in constant physical
contact with the seabed or the subsoil."
The failure of the Shelf Convention to consider other
possible uses of the continental shelf was dramatically
demonstrated by the debate on a Bulgarian proposal introduced
at the Conference which would have prohibited the coastal
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state from constructing military bases on the continental
shelf. 35 Mr. Belinsky, the Bulgarian representative, based
his proposal in part on the theory that "the continental
shelf should be used solely for the utilization of its natural
resource and for no other purpose. 3"
In commenting on the proposal, Mr. Letts of Peru indi-
cated that he did not believe the Bulgarian proposal was
necessary, since "the coastal State exercised exclusive rights
only for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources . "37 This comment led Mr. Munch of the Federal
Republic of Germany to point out that since "all rights over
the continental shelf other than those set forth in Article 68
were open to everyone, . . . any state could build installa-
tions on it. "38
In view of these statements, India proposed an amend-
ment to the Bulgarian proposal:
The coastal State shall have the right and the obli-
gation to prevent the continental shelf from being used
for the purpose of building military bases or installa-
tions .39
This amendment would seem to suggest that India was not
certain that the coastal state had the authority to prohibit
other states from constructing military installations on its
continental shelf without "a right additional to those set
forth in Article 68.
"
4o
Later Bulgaria withdrew her proposal in favor of one
introduced by India which provided:
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The continental shelf adjacent to any coastal
State shall not be used by the Coastal State or any
other State for the purpose of building military
bases or installations. 41
In commenting on the original Bulgarian proposal, Dr.
Mouton of the Netherlands stated that "the fact that the
coastal State did not exercise sovereign rights over the con-
tinental shelf, but only exclusive rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting its natural resources, removed all
possibilities of the threat which the proposal envisioned. "42
Later, however, in commenting on the Indian proposal, Dr.
Mouton stated that since the International Law Commission had
only considered "proposals relating to the exploration and ex-
ploitation of the natural resources," and had not considered
the "many other possible ways of using the continental shelf,"
that "no such extraneous questions should be introduced into
the work of the Conference." 43 Thus, Dr. Mouton seemed to
have come to the realization that the coastal state might have
rights to the continental shelf which were unrelated to the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources, but that
since they had not been considered by the Commission they
should not be raised at this time. Several delegates seem to
have agreed with Dr. Mouton on this point. Mr. Van der Essen
of Belgium stated that the "Indian proposal was outside the
Committee's terms of reference," and Miss Whiteman of the
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United States felt that the Indian proposal went "far beyond
the subject matter considered by the International Law
Commission . " 44
Other delegates, however, had far different reasons
for voting against the proposal. Mr. Obiols-Gomez of Guate-
mala stated that he would not vote for the proposal "since
Guatemala had declared its sovereignty over its continental
shelf, and could therefore not accept the restriction emboidied
in the Indian proposal." 45 Mr. Lescure of Argentina stated
that he could not vote for the proposal as it was now worded,
but that if it were changed, so as to only prohibit other
states, and not the coastal state, from constructing military
installations on the shelf, he would vote for it, as it would
then recognize the "coastal States' s right of sovereignty"
AC.
over its continental shelf.
Subsequently the Indian proposal was defeated by a vote
of 31 to 18, with 6 abstentions, 4 ' but the rejection of the
proposal was based on a number of factors, and not upon any
agreement among the delegates as to the nature and extent of
the coastal state's authority over the continental shelf. Thus




C. Subsequent Practice of the
Coastal States
1. The North Sea Installations Act
The Netherlands had the distinction of being the first
nation to have a radio and television station, Radio and T.V.
Noordzee , operated off its coast from an artificial structure
erected on its continental shelf. In early 1964, the Reclame
Exploit at ie Maatschappij , a limited liability company formed
under Dutch law, advised the government that it intended to
construct an artificial island on the continental shelf out-
side Dutch territorial waters, and to use the installation to
transmit radio and television broadcasts into the Netherlands
The station began transmissions on July 29, 1964. °
There were two reasons for the company's disclosure of
its intent. First, the company hoped to arouse public
opinion against the government's monopoly on broadcasting.
Under Dutch law there is a monopoly created in five broad-
casting associations, "each of which represents an important
religious or political faction of the population." These
associations are financially supported by the government, and
the law prohibits any commercial exploitation of radio or
television. Second, the company believed that the govern-
ment's failure to take any action against the ship-based
Radio-Veronica
, which had been operating off the Dutch coast
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since 1959, precluded the government from taking any action
against the operation of the station unless it changed its
attitude with regard to the Veronica . The company was
successful in obtaining public support, but it was wrong about
the government being unable to take any action against it.
Because of its shipping interests, and the doctrine of the
freedom of the seas as it pertains to vessels, the government





on December 3, 1964, the Netherlands passed the North Sea
Installations Act, which extended Dutch law to all fixed in-
stallations constructed on her continental shelf. On December
17, 1964, the police landed on the installation and put the
transmitter out of operation. Warrants were issued against
the operators and the broadcasting installation was im-
pounded.^"
The Dutch Legislature made it quite clear that it was
not basing its claim to jurisdiction over all installations on
the continental shelf on the wording of the Shelf Convention.
Instead, it argued that there was no positive law on the sub-
ject and that unless someone assumed jurisdiction over these
activities a "legal vacuum" would be created. The Legislature
based the right of the coastal state to regulate these
activities on three distinct considerations. First, if a
"legal vacuum" were allowed to exist these installations
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might quickly become breeding grounds for criminal and other
undesirable activities. Second, both the coastal state and
the world community have important interests in the shelf
region which need to be protected, and third, the coastal
state, because of its adjacency, has the most interests in
the area and is in the best position to regulate them.->°
It is clear that the coastal state does have an inter-
est in broadcasting. There are only a limited number of
frequencies available, and there is a need for some type of
"traffic control." In addition, these transmissions, from
whatever source they originate, have an effect within the
territory of the coastal state, and there is a need to con-
trol their contents in order to prevent them from endangering
the security, public order, mental health and good morals of
the coastal state. There are also many other interests in-
directly involved, such as the protection of copyrights, the
payments of royalties, and the collection of taxes from pro-
fits. 51
In addition to the interests of the coastal state,
there are also inclusive interests of the world community which
require the regulation of broadcasting. Frequencies are
assigned by the International Telecommunications Union, and
the use of unauthorized frequencies could have an adverse
52
effect on sea and air navigation.
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While all of these factors suggest that the Netherlands
did have a right to regulate broadcasting, the Act went far
beyond this need and extended coastal authority to all in-
stallations on the shelf, for whatever purpose constructed,
and whether erected by private individuals or foreign states?
2. The Triumph Reef Case
Triumph Reef is a group of shallow coral formations com-
posed of Triumph Reef, Pacific Reef, Ajax Reef, Long Reed, and
an unnamed reef, which lie four and one-half miles off Elliot
Key and ten miles off the Florida mainland some fifteen miles
south and east of the densely populated area of Dade County
Florida. These reefs have been shown on United States Coast
and Geodectic charts since 1878. 4
Some time in 1962, Mr. William Anderson "discovered"
these reefs by conceiving the idea of occupying them through
the construction of facilities for a "fishing club, marina,
skin diving club, a hotel, and perhaps as the chief lure, a
gambling casino." He gave notice of his claim, in late 1962
and early 1963 , by means of newspaper advertisements. His
"rights" were subsequently acquired by Atlantis Development
Corporation, Ltd., a Bahamian corporation."
Thereafter, Atlantis "patiently" sought to establish
its legal position from various agencies of the State and
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Federal Government of the United States. In reply to a
letter to the State of Florida,. Atlantis was advised that the
reefs were "outside the Constitutional Boundaries of the
State of Florida." Atlantis then turned to the Federal
Government, and on September 14, 1962, the Deparcment of In-
terior advised Atlantis that "the Department of Interior has
no jurisdiction over land that is outside the territorial
limits of the United States," and that "questions concerning
such lands should be taken up with the Department of State."
On November 9, 1962, the Department of State, through the
Assistant Legal Advisor, informed Atlantis that "the areas in
question are outside the jurisdiction of the United States
and constitute a part of the high seas," and that as such "are
open to all nations and no state may validly subject any part
of them to its sovereignty."^
On the basis of this information, Atlantis spent approx-
imately $50,000 for tests, surveys, experiments, and the con-
struction of four prefabricated buildings., three of which
were distroyed by a hurrican in September 1963. It was
Atlantis' intent to eventually create an independent island
nation on a 2,600 acre artifical island constructed on the
reefs. The plans included the construction of a radio and
television station, a post office and other government build-
ings, an international bank where people could bank by number
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as they do in Switzerland, and a gambling casino. The total
cost of the project was estimated at $250 million, and the
value of the land, based on land values in Miami Beach and
Las Vegas, was estimated at over a billion dollars.
"
On October 24, 1963, the District Engineer , Corps of
Engineers, Jacksonville, Florida, sent a letter to Atlantis
advising it that a permit was required by law before any con-
struction could be begun on the reefs. Atlantis removed
the one remaining building, and in November of 1963 , sent a
letter to the Corps of Engineers requesting it to reconsider
its position. On or about October 5, 1964, the Office of the
Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C. , replied that a permit
would still be required for any construction on the reefs.
Atlantis never applied for the permit. 58
On November 16, 1964, Acme General Contractors, Inc.,
a Florida corporation, through its President, Mr. Louis M. Ray,
applied to the Corps of Engineers for a permit to begin con-
struction on the reefs. The purpose of the construction as
stated in the letter was to be the creation of a resort arear9
However, there is some evidence to indicate that he actually
intended to create a sovereign island nation, the Grand Capri
Republic. 60
Upon learning of the request for a permit by Acme,
Atlantis filed a written objection to the Corps of Engineers
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on December 31, 1964, asserting its claims to ownership of
the reefs. No action was taken on the objection, but the
Corps of Engineers denied Acme's request for a permit. In
March 1965/ Acme proceeded to dredge and fill three circular
island formations, two on Triumph Reef and one on Long Reef.
In April 1965, the United States sought an injunction from
the United States District Court in Florida to prevent any
further construction on the reefs. On April 16, Atlantis
filed a motion to intervene, which was denied, and on April
21, the court granted a preliminary injunction.
Before beginning any discussion of the trial on the •
merits , it might be useful to first examine the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands ActD ^ (hereinafter referred to as the
Shelf Act) . The Act was very poorly drafted, and created
many of the problems in the case. Section 3(a) states:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States
that the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf appertains to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition
as provided in this subchapter ."3
The language of this section is very broad and seems to
give the United States jurisdiction and control over the sub-
soil and seabed itself and not merely rights to the natural
resources. Griffin argues that this language was no accident,
and cites the Senate Report on the bill to show that the
committee actually intended to extend jurisdiction over the
subsoil and seabed of the .outer continental shelf. 64
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Yet Section 4(a) (1) provides that:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are hereby extended to
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf
and to all artificial islands and fixed structures
which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, removing, and transporting resources
therefrom. "5
The wording of this section seems to raise a question as
to what law, if any, would apply to installations and fixed
structures erected for purposes unrelated to the exploration
for or exploitation of natural resources.
Section 4(b) adds a jurisdictional mystery by stating
that:
The United States district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of
or in connection with any operations conducted on the
outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, removing or transporting by pipeline
the natural resources, or involving rights to the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Con-
tinental Shelf. 66
The wording of this section raises the question of what
court, if any, has jurisdiction over activities not involving
natural resources. Perhaps part of the mystery can be ex-
plained by the fact that the Act was primarily concerned with
the exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources,
and only provides the Secretary of the Interior with the
authority to grant leases for the exploration of oil, natural
gas, sulphur and other minerals, and no agency of the Federal
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Government has been given the authority to authorize other
uses of the outer continental shelf. "' Therefore, since the
Act only authorizes activities relating to the exploration
and exploitation of mineral resources, it was unnecessary to
make provisions for the regulation or control of other
activities
.
Finally, Section 4(f) provides that:
The authority of the Secretary of the Army to
prevent obstructions to navigation in the navigable
waters of the United States is hereby extended to
artificial islands and fixed structures located on
the outer Continental Shelf. 68
The wording of this section does not seem to limit the
authority of the Secretary of the Army to installations
erected for "the purpose of exploring for, developing, re-
moving, and transporting resources." Also, the authority
referred to in this section is that granted to the Secretary
of the Army under Section 10 of the River and Harbors Act of
1899, which prohibits the erection of any obstruction to
navigation. "9 Griffin points out that this section was "added
by the same Senate Committee which amended the bill to extend
dominion over the whole substance of the shelf rather than just
natural resources," and that to limit the authority of the
Secretary of the Army to structures relating to natural re-
sources would produce the anomaly that he could regulate
structures erected for lawful purposes, but would be powerless
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to prevent the construction of installations for illegal
or unauthorized purposes.™
Now that we have examined the problems created by the
wording of the Shelf Act, we can look at the court's treatment
of the problems. In granting the preliminary injunction the
court was very vague about the basis of its jurisdiction.
It found that the defendants' activities would destroy these
reefs, which were "unique and rare in this part of the world,"
that "this entire coral reef is a sensitive living thing which
has taken nature, through its patience and exquisite care/
countless centuries to develop," and that the "entire reef
formation stands as a sentry against the sea and protects
7 1the grass beds where many varieties of fish feed." /J- Thus the
court seemed to be saying that the activity involves "rights
to the natural resources."
On the appeal by Atlantis on the question of its right
to intervene, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision
of the lower court, raised two important questions in dicta:
does the Shelf Act give the United States" jurisdiction over
the shelf for purposes unrelated to "exploring for, developing,
removing, and transporting resources therefrom;" and does
the authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent ob-
structions to navigation extend to "artificial islands and




At the subsequent trial on the merits the lower
court avoided directly answering these questions. The court
solved the jurisdictional problem by finding that the coral
reefs were "rare and priceless natural resources of this
nation/' noting that prior to its decision Congress had
enacted the Biscayne National Monument Bill, which placed
both Triumph and Long Reefs with the boundaries of the Monu-
ment. Thus the court found as a matter of law that the pro-
posed construction would "constitute 'artificial islands and
fixed structures . . . erected . . . for the purpose of . . .
developing' the reefs." '^
On the permit issue the court found that the "reef
area is extensively navigated (emphasis added) ." Regardless,
however, of whether the waters over the reefs were actually
navigable, courts have long held waters to be navigable, even
when in fact they are not.' 4
A new issue was raised at the trial when the Govern-
ment, as an additional basis for its cause of action, con-
tended that any construction on the continental shelf without
authority constituted a trespass on Government land. This
argument raised a key issue as to the actual nature of the
United States' proprietary interest in the continental shelf.
In answering the issue, the court took a long look at the
history of the United States' shelf claims. The court noted
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that the Submerged Lands Act, whereby the Federal Government
relinquished all rights to the submerged lands beneath the
territorial waters to State authority, used the term "title
to and ownership of the lands ,"75 while the Shelf Act used
the term "jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition,"'"
indicating that the nature of the authority claimed over the
areas was different. Thus the court found that the interest
claimed by the United States over the outer continental shelf
was something less than fee simple, and would not support an
action for trespass quare clausum fregit . 77 The court did not
elaborate on the nature of the United States' proprietary
interest except to comment:
Whatever proprietary interest exists with respect
to these reefs belongs to the United States under both
national (Shelf Act) and international (Shelf Conven-
tion) law. Although this interest may be limited, it is
nevertheless the only interest recognized by law, and
such interest in the United States precludes the claims
of the defendants and intervenor
,
78
By deciding the case on the ground that the activities
involved the natural resources, the court- avoided the problem
of determining what right, if any, the United States has to
exercise authority over the continental shelf for purposes
other than the exploration and exploitation of its natural re-
sources. It is clear, however, that the case involved more




If these reefs were available for private
construction totally outside the control of the United
States Government, they could conceivably support not
only artificial islands and unpoliced gambling casinos,
but even an alien missile base, all within a short
distance of the Florida Coast. 79
D. Trends in Decision
The subsequent practice of the coastal states would
seem to suggest that they do not consider their interests in
the continental shelf limited to exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources. One writer recently summed up the
practice of the coastal states in the following manner:
. . . A7t seems that the state practice is moving in the
direction of a new rule of law that a coastal state may
exercise plenary jurisdiction and control over the ad-
jacent sea bottom and installations thereon for all
purposes without using the label " sovereignty . "80
Likewise, many of the suggestions made for proposed
uses of the continental shelf seem .to assume that the coastal
state does have interests in the shelf unrelated to explora-
tion and exploitation. The Commission on Marine Science,
Engineering and Resources has recently recommended that
studies be made for the development of offshore terminals,
storage facilities and nuclear power plants, and that efforts
O "I
be made to strengthen activities related to acquaculture
.
Also, one writer has suggested that:
In the interest of a more adequate enjoyment by the
public of the outer Continental Shelf, it is proposed
that a U.S. executive agency ... be given authority
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by Congress to lease certain areas of /the7 outer
Continental Shelf to private legal persons . . . for
their exclusive use for purposes of building structures
thereon which will be utilized for such undertakings as
(1) "sealabs" or underwater laboratories, (2) fish farms
or marine biological experimental stations, (3) bona fide
recreational centers, or (4) gas stations or similar such
offshore service centers for sport fishermen and motor
op
boat yachtsmen.
E. Appraisal and Recommendation
It is obvious that the proximity of the continental
shelf to the coastal state's territorial base of power creates
a danger to its security. The Truman Proclamation stated
that " self -protection compels the coastal nation to keep close
watch over activities off its shores which are of a nature
necessary for the utilization of these resources." While the
Proclamation was only concerned with activities associated
with the exploitation of the natural resources, it would seem
that the existence of pirate broadcasting stations, gambling
casinos, and alien missile bases would pose even more of a
threat to the security of the coastal state. As Professors
McDougal and Burke point out:
It would be wholly fanciful to expect that a coastal
state would feel bound to stand aside while another,
possibly hostile, state erected military facilities
appearing above the surface or wholly submerged in the
ocean areas adjacent to its coast. °3
To admit that the coastal state has other interests in
the shelf region, is not, however, to suggest that the coastal
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state should be given "sovereignty" over its continental shelf.
We should not be willing to assume that all coastal interests
are important enough to warrant the limitation or restriction
of inclusive interests, or that all inclusive uses of the con-
tinental shelf will have an adverse effect upon important
coastal interests. To grant the coastal state a complete com-
prehensive competence over the continental shelf under the
label of "sovereignty" to protect certain of its important
interests seems entirely unnecessary. The concept of the
contiguous zone would seem to be a much more rational means
of accomplishing this objective without destroying all the
inclusive interests of the world community.
The true function of the contiguous zone is to recog-
nize a limited competence of the coastal state to regulate
activities beyond the limits of the territorial sea which
have a unique impact upon important coastal interests, with-
out recognizing all the comprehensive competence associated
with sovereignty. 84
In the eighteenth century, England, the champion of the
freedom of the seas, passed the first of a series of "Hovering
Acts," which extended British jurisdiction over foreign vessels
engaged in smuggling as far as 100 leagues from her coast. 8 ^
Similarly, in 1804, Chief Justice Marshall, in the famous
case of Church v. Hubbart , recognized Portugal's right to
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exercise jurisdiction over American vessels on the contiguous
high seas to protect her commercial interests in the colony
of Brazil. 86
The past practice of coastal states clearly establishes
that the concept of the contiguous zone has been used to pro-
tect and promote a variety of interests, under entirely
different circumstances, and at various distances from the
shore. ' As Professors McDougal and Burke point out:
State practice firmly establishes that the widths
states may claim for contiguous zones are to be deter-
mined primarily by the requirements of securing pro-
tection of the particular interests. Such requirements
observably vary through time and with the interests at-
stake, changing both with the emergence of new interests
requiring new measures of protection and with the con-
ditions under which more traditional interests must be
secured. 88
Recently, there has been an attempt to restrict the
concept to the protection of certain stated interests at a
fixed distance from the shore. An example of this rigid con-
ception of the doctrine of the contiguous zone can be seen
in the treatment of the concept in the 1958 Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea. Article 24 of the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone8 ^ Hereinafter
referred to as the Territorial Sea Convention) establishes a
single contiguous zone twelve miles in width as measured from
the baseline for the territorial sea, for the limited purpose
of protecting custom, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
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regulations. This attempt to create a single zone completely
ignores the fact that it is the importance of the interest
sought to be protected and not the distance from shore at
which the power is exercised which is the controlling factor:
It would serve no useful purpose to attempt to state
what is adjacent in terms of miles. . . . The distance
from shore at which these powers may be exercised is
determined not by milage but by the necessity of the
littoral state and by the connection between the in-
terests of its territory and the act performed on the
high seas. 90
Similarly, Dr. Masterson states:
The laws passed to protect or regulate these various
interests, or claims, involve different considerations,
and they have, therefore, developed along different lines;
laws securing or regulating a particular interest have
been evolved from factors peculiar to such interests.
They, thus, necessarily present distinct questions, and
should therefore, be delt with separately in a study of
the law pertaining to jurisdiction in the littoral seas.
The attempt within recent years, on the part of some
writers, judges, and governments, to fix a single zone
beyond which the application or enforcement of them all
is forbidden, thus treating them as a single problem,
has cast this extremely difficult subject into hope-
less confusion, and has littered the juristic literature
on the subject with careless assertion. *
Likewise, the restrictions on the .type of interests
which the coastal state may seek to protect is not in con-
formity with the actual practices of states. 2 In 1966, the
United States joined a long list of nations claiming jurisdic-
tion and control over fisheries beyond the limits of the
territorial sea,^3 even though the right to establish "fisher-
ies zones" is not provided for by the Territorial Sea Conven-
tion. But as one writer commented:
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The legality of these contiguous fisheries zones
depends on customary law developed through the practice
of states and not on any express provisions of the
1958 Geneva Conventions . "4
It is also clear that many writers do not understand
the true function of the concept of the contiguous zone.
Perhaps the worst example is the treatment of the concept by
Dr. colombos. In denying the validity of the doctrine of
the contiguous zone Dr. Colombos states:
The adoption of a contiguous zone in which only cer-
tain territorial rights may be exercised would further
increase these difficulties /of the distinction between
the regime of the high seas and that of the territorial
seas7, as it would superimpose on the present distinc-
tion between the high seas and the territorial waters
an additional distinction between the proposed contiguous
zone and the territorial waters. The fact that these
different regimes would be applicable in respect of waters
which are essentially the same, since they all form part
of the sea, would inevitably lead to serious legal
complications which appear to be both dangerous and
difficult of application. It would also impose a bur-
den on the coastal State in respect of the effective
maintenance of patrol service for the enforcement of
its custom, fiscal and safety regulations. -*
Dr. Colombos 1 suggestion that waters should be governed
by the same legal regime because "they all form part of the
sea," is somewhat amazing. It is like suggesting that the
continent of Europe should be governed by a single legal-
political regime because it all forms part of a single land
mass. Also, the argument that the establishment of a conti-
guous zone would place too much of a burden on the enforcement
powers of the coastal state overlooks the .fact that the
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powers of the coastal state overlooks the .fact that the
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establishment of such a zone is a right and not a duty. If
the coastal state felt that the creation of such a zone would
place too much of a burden on its enforcement services, it
would simply not establish one. Thus Dr. Colombos' reasons
for rejecting the concept of the contiguous zone do not appear
to be valid.
More important, however, Dr. Colombos does not appear
to understand the true function of the contiguous zone. He
constantly refers to it as an "extension of territorial
waters.""" In discussing the limited contiguous zone approved
in the Territorial Seas Convention Dr. Colombos states:
It is doubtful how far these rules /establishing the
limited contiguous zone7 may prove acceptable to the
British and United States Governments. . . . As already
stated, these Governments do not recognize any extension
of territorial waters beyond three miles unless they
are parties to an international or bilateral agreement
(emphasis added)
.
Also, Dr. Colombos fails to realize that fisheries
zones are merely another type of contiguous zone. Thus he
treats them entirely separate:
There exists, however, no valid reason for treating
the question of the traditional three-mile zone of
territorial waters on the same basis as the extension of
these waters for fishery protection, as the two matters
are quite separate. A minimum limit of territorial
waters appears as necessary today as in the days of
Grotius, but the necessity of safeguarding the food re-
sources of the sea to meet the ever-expanding increase of




Dr. Colombos 1 refusal to recognize the concept of the
contiguous zone because of his. desire to see the authority of
the coastal state limited to a narrow three-mile territorial
sea, is actually encouraging the thing which he most fears.
By refusing to recognize any competence of the coastal state
beyond the limits of the territorial sea, the coastal state
will be forced to seek a wide territorial sea to protect its
interests. This is precisely what happened in the North Sea
Installations Act case. The Netherlands did not believe that
it had the authority under existing international law to
prohibit pirate broadcasting beyond the limits of its terri-
torial sea, and so it made a comprehensive claim to competence
over the continental shelf in order to protect this limited
interest. As Professors McDougal and Burke warn:
One who snaps at the minnow of a limited, occasional,
exclusive authority in a contiguous zone must, apparently,
perforce swallow the whale of a comprehensive, continu-
ing, exclusive competence in such zone.""
It is important to remember the recognition of the
exclusive right of the coastal state to exploit the natural
resources of the contiguous submarine areas outside the coastal
state's territorial sea, is merely another example of the
world community recognizing a limited competence of the
coastal state under the concept of the contiguous zone. Thus
in reality the doctrine of the continental shelf is merely
another example of the flexibility of the concept of the
contiguous zone . ^

39
This failure on the part of some decision-makers to
realize the true juridical basis of the doctrine on the con-
tinental shelf could lead to serious problems. The Inter-
national Court of Justice, in an opinion of February 20, 1969,
on the question of the delimitation of the boundaries of the
continental shelf of the North Sea as it pertains to the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark,
seemingly in dicta, stated:
Submarine areas do not really appertain to the coastal
State because—or not only because—they are near it.
They are near it of course; but this would not be suffice
to confer title, any more than, according to a well-
established principle of law recognized by both sides in
the present case, mere proximity confers per se title
to land territory. What confers the ipso jure title
which international law attributes to the coastal State
in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that
the submerged areas concerned may be deemed to be actually
part of the territory over which the coastal State already
has dominion, --in the sense that, although covered with
water, they are a prolongation .or continuation of that
territory, an extent ion of it under the sea.^-'-
The opinion of the court is rather shocking in view
of all the care which the drafters of the Shelf Convention
took to avoid the recognition of coastal state "sovereignty"
over the continental shelf. The court's recognition of
"sovereignty" over the shelf also raises a problem with regard
to the status of the superjacent waters. Recently Ambassador
Pardo of Malta stated:
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It is a traditional principle of international law
that a State exercising sovereignty over land also
exercises jurisdiction over the superjacent atmosphere up
to the still undefined limits of outer space, but the
sea is the atmosphere of the ocean floor, hence a State
exercising sovereignty over an area of the ocean floor
also has a claim to jurisdiction over the superjacent sea
despite the wording of article 3 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention /Shelf Convention/. ° 2
It is not too surprising, therefore, that Judge Fauad
Ammoun , in a separate opinion, came to the conclusion that the
epicontinental sea was a supplementary and inseparable concept
of the doctrine of the continental shelf. J
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tanaka, seems to have
realized the true basis of the doctrine:
As to the idea and the fundamental principle which
govern the continental shelf as a legal institution, it
is evidently the realization of harmony between the two
interests: the one the interest of individual coastal
States for exploration of their continental shelves and
exploitation of natural resources; the other the interests
of the international community, particularly the safe-
guarding of the freedom of the high seas. ^
Thus Judge Tanaka realized that the recognition of the
coastal state's right to explore the shelf and to exploit its
natural resources must be balanced with the inclusive interests
of the world community. The majority view that it was a geo-
logical consideration which led to the creation of the doctrine
of the continental shelf ignores the fact that the Shelf
Convention sought to protect and balance both sets of interests.
The recognition of coastal state "sovereignty" over the

41
continental shelf could give rise to comprehensive claims to
authority over the superjacent .waters and airspace, thereby
destroying the inclusive interests of the world community.
It is unbelievable that the majority of the court could have
arrived at a decision so disruptive in its impacc upon the
common interests of the world community.

III. THE DELIMITATION OF THE AREA OF
COASTAL AUTHORITY
A. The Geological Continental Shelf
Before beginning any discussion of the claims to
delimit the area of the juridical continental shelf, it may
be useful to examine the geological concept of the continental
shelf. In very basic geological terms, every continent rest
on a submarine platform or base, which slopes gently seaward
from the law-water mark to a point where a substantial break
in grade occurs, at which point the terrain slopes steeply
seaward until the great ocean depths are reached. This gently
sloping base is known as the "continental shelf," and the
steeply sloping area is called the "continental slope." Some-
times there is an apron of sediments at the base of the
continental slope, which slopes very gently seaward until it
merges with the deep ocean floor. This apron of sediments is
known as the "continental rise."
Like the surface of the land above the water, the
continental shelf is often uneven and irregular. In fact,
the shelf area between Maine, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland is




system. Even at the edge of the shelf the depth varies from
less than 100 meters to more than 300 meters, and although
the depth has traditionally been considered to be 100 fathoms
(200 meters) , the actual average depth is 133 meters. The
width of the shelf also varies substantially throughout the
world, and in the United States alone, the width varies from
less than one nautical mile off parts of the California
coast to 250 miles off the coast of New England.
If we think of the continental shelf as the area lying
between the shore and the first substantial "fall-off/' then
many of the adjacent submarine areas are excluded from the
definition. Along the entire Pacific coast of South America
the first substantial fall-off occurs very near the shore,
while in the Persian Gulf there is no substantial change in
the slope of the floor and the water never reaches a depth of
600 feet. Also, there are often deep trenches separating
parts of the continental shelf, which could be considered
the first substantial fall-off, and along the coast of Southern
California the floor is a checkerboard of basins, banks, and
islands, resulting in the use of the term "continental boarder-




B. Areas Claimed under the
Unilateral Proclamations
It is interesting to note that the Treaty of Paria
used the words "submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria" to
delimit the area over which the parties claimed exclusive
control, since the Gulf of Paria is not part of a geological
continental shelf. It was the Truman Proclamation which first
used the term "continental shelf" in a juridical context.
While the Proclamation did not define the term, the press
release which accompanied it stated that the continental shelf
was considered to be the submerged land contiguous to the
continent which was covered by not more than 100 fathoms (600
feet) of water. 108
Many of the subsequent unilateral instruments continued
to use the term "continental shelf" to delimit the area of
exclusive authority, but a study of these instruments reveals
that the extent of the areas claimed varied considerably.
Some of the instruments defined the shelf in terms of
the depth of the superjacent waters. Mexico, for example,
defined the shelf as the land "covered by sea water up to two
109hundred meters of depth at the level of the low tide."
Other instruments, particularly those issued by states
with little or no shallow submerged areas, defined the area
of exclusive control in terms of a fixed distance from the
shore. Chile,, for example, claimed exclusive control over an
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area within a line 200 marine miles distance from and parallel
to its coast. 110 Still others, such as that of Argentina,
did not define the term at all, thus leaving uncertainty as
to the actual nature and extent of the claim.
C. History of Article One of the
Shelf Convention
From the very beginning of its study of the juridical
doctrine of the continental shelf, the International Law
Commission rejected the idea that the area of exclusive con-
trol must depend upon the existence of a geological conti-
nental shelf. Instead, it sought to provide for those
shallow areas which were not part of any geological shelf
by defining the area in terms of the ability to exploit its
natural resources. 112 In 1951, the exploitability test was
incorporated into the Commission's first draft articles:
As here used, the term "continental shelf" refers
to the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas
contiguous to the coasts, but outside the territorial
waters, where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits the exploitation of the natural resources of
the sea-bed and subsoil.
In 1953, the criticism of the "exploitability test"
led the Commission to adopt a depth test of 200 meters to
delimit the area of exclusive control. 11^
In 1956 , a Specialized Conference of the Organization
of American States met in Ciudad Trujillo, and the
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representatives of twenty-one American states adopted a
resolution which defined the continental shelf as the seabed
and subsoil of the adjacent submarine areas "to a depth of 200
meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits the exploitation of the natural re-
sources. 5 Using' this resolution as the basis of his argu-
ment, Dr. Garcia-Amador , the Chairman at the Commission's
Eighth Session in 1956, proposed that the Commission adopt
the Ciudad Trujillo "exploitability test." He argued that this
would give those states with no shallow submerged areas "equal
in theory" treatment with the other states. The Commission
finally adopted the exploitability test, although it seems
that the major reason for the Commission's adoption of this
criterion was the belief that a delimitation of the area in
terms of the depth of the superjacent waters might prohibit
or discourage exploitation beyond this depth, and might be
difficult to change when technology made exploitation beyond
this depth possible. 116 The 1956 draft Article 67 read:
For the purpose of these articles, the term
"continental shelf is used as referring to the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to
a depth of 200 meters (approximately 100 fathoms) , or,
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the said area.^7
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Except for the addition of a clause providing that
the definition would include submarine areas adjacent to
islands, the Conference adopted the draft article as Article
1 of the Shelf Convention. 118
There has been considerable disagreement as to the
actual area delimited by Article 1 because of the vagueness
of the exploitability test. Dr. Oda of Japan argues that the
clear and unambiguous language of Article 1 has divided the
whole of the ocean floor among the coastal states. He
basis this argument on the theory that the phrase "or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources," will
enable the coastal state, as its technological capabilities
develop, to extend its jurisdiction seaward up to the midway
point between it and the coastal state on the opposite side.
The problem with Dr. Oda's theory is that it assumes that the
wording of Article 1 is clear and unambiguous. In reality,
words are merely "shadows on paper," and have no "normal" or
"ordinary" meaning except in the total context in which they
are used. Instead of mechanically searching for some pre-
existing meaning of the words under the "clear meaning rule,"
the decision-maker must seek to discover the true expectations
of the drafters and the objectives or values which they sought
to promote or protect. Under this "general purpose rule,"
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the decision-maker is provided with a methodology which will
enable him to give a meaning to the words which, under the
principle of efficacy, will serve the general purpose intended
by the drafters. Only then can the document accomplish the
120purpose which it was intended to serve. The Harvard Re-
search Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties lists some of
the factors which are relevant to the problem of determining
the general purpose of the document:
The historical background of the treaty, the
travaux preparatoires , the circumstances of the parties
at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in
these circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent
conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the
treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time inter-
pretation is being made, are to be considered in connec-
tion with the general purpose which the treaty is intend-
ed to serve. -*-21
When we apply the "general purpose rule" to the lan-
guage of Article 1, it becomes clear that the drafters did
not intend to include the whole of the ocean floor within the
definition of the continental shelf. The legislative history
shows that the exploitability test was adopted in order to
give "equal in theory" treatment to those states with little
or no shallow submerged areas, to encourage exploitation
beyond the depth of 200 meters, and to prevent the need of
frequent revision to keep pace with advances in technology.
Also, the drafters could not foresee the rapid advances in
technology which would take place in the immediate future.
The Conference had before it a document which represented
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"the latest technical information concerning the possibility
of exploiting the mineral resources of the subsoil," and
which predicted that the 200 metres," and "adjacent," all of
which show an intent to delimit the area of exclusive author-
ity. The importance which the Commission gave to these terms
can be seen in the Commentary on the 1956 draft articles. In
explaining the importance of the term "200 metres," the
Commission stated:
It seemed likely that a limit fixed at a point
where the sea covering the continental shelf reaches
a depth of 200 metres would at present be sufficient for
all practical needs. This depth also coincides with
that at which the continental shelf in the geological
sense generally comes to an end and the continental
slope begins. . . . The Commission felt, however, that
such a limit would have the disadvantage of instability.
Technical developments in the near future might make it
possible to exploit the resources of the seabed at a
depth of over 200 metres. Moreover, the continental
shelf might well include submarine areas lying at a
depth of over 200 metres. 12 3
In commenting on the retention of the term "continental
shelf" to delimit the area rather than the use of some other
term such as "submarine areas," the Commission noted that it
"decided to retain the term 'continental shelf because it is
in current use and because the term 'submarine areas' used
without further explanation would not give a sufficient
indication of the nature of the area in question. " 1^4 -j.^
Commission also gave importance to the concept of "contiguity"
and the use of the term adjacent:
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Neither is it possible to disregard the geographical
phenomenon whatever the term--propinquity / contiguity,
geographical continuity, appurtenance or identity-
used to define the relationship between the submarine
areas in question and the adjacent nonsubmerged land. ^5
Thus the Shelf Convention was only concerned with the
adjacent submerged lands, although the precise delimitation
of the area is uncertain.
The argument that the " exploitability test" would allow
the coastal state to extend its jurisdiction seaward to the
midway point between it and the opposite or adjacent coastal
state ignores the limiting words of the Shelf Convention and
the intent of the drafters, but just as important , such an
interpretation would be unacceptable to the world community.
As Ambassador Pardo of Malta points out:
In all probability ... a division which would give
small islands, such as Clipperton and St. Helena, sovereign
rights over millions of square miles of valuable ocean
floor would not be generally acceptable to the inter-
national community. . . .
. . . /l7t would operate to the disadvantage not only
of landlocked countries but also of countries, that do
not possess the requisite technology -or financial re-
sources for development of their share of the ocean
floor or that are, as the Soviet Union, in a disadvanta-
geous geographical position. It is highly unlikely that
a division of the ocean floor among coastal states would
be easily accepted by the international community. In-
stead the consequences of this approach are likely to be
a sharp rise in world tension. 126
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D. Subsequent Practice of the Coastal States
While the legislative history of the Shelf Convention
indicates that the drafters envisioned a "narrow" shelf , the
subsequent practice of the coastal states suggests that the
"exploitability test" has been used to extend coastal authority
seaward far beyond these limits.
The extent of the United States 1 claims can be seen
from a statement by Charles F. Luce, Under Secretary of the
Department of the Interior, in an address before the American
Bar Association on June 8, 1967:
The United States has taken action consistent with
a claim of sovereign rights to the seabed and subfloor
some distance from its coasts, by the granting of a
phosphate lease some 40 miles from the California Coast
in the Forty-mile Bank area in 240 to 4,000 feet of water;
by granting of oil and gas leases some 30 miles off the
Oregon coast in about 1,500 feet of water; and in the
threatened litigation against creation of a new island
by private parties on Cortes Bank about 50 miles from
San Clemente Island off the coast of California or about
100 miles from the mainland. Each of the California areas
is separated from the coast by troughs as much as 4,000
to 5,000 feet deep. The Department of the Interior has
published OCS leasing maps indicating an intent to assume
jurisdiction over the ocean bottoms as far as 100 miles
off the Southern California coast in water depths as
great as 6000 feet. 127
Off the Atlantic coast the United States has issued
permits for exploratory drilling in areas with depths of from
4000 to 5000 feet, and in the Gulf of Mexico permits have
been issued in areas with depths of 1100 meters, more than
100 miles from the shore. 2 ^
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Other states have made similar and in some cases even
more extensive claims. Australia has issued exploration
permits for areas as far as 200 miles from the coast, and
Honduras and Nicaragua have issued licenses in areas as far
as 225 miles from their shores. 129
Not all claims to jurisdiction and control, however,
have involved the exploration for and exploitation of the
natural resources. Recently two attempts were made to estab-
lish independent island nations on the Cortes Bank some 110
miles west of San Diego, California. In both instances the
United States responded to the threatened construction of these
islands claiming the Cortes Bank as part of the outer
continental shelf.
In November 1966 a group of San Diego businessmen
decided to build an artificial island on the Cortes Bank,
and to establish an independent island nation of Abalonia.
They planned to build a tax free processing plant on the island
and to harvest abalone and lobsters from the rich and virtually
1 on
unfished waters. JU
The entrepreneurs obtained a 366 foot World War II
surplus troop ship, the S.S. Jalisco, reinformced it with con-
crete, towed it to the "bank/ moored it and opened the sea
cocks, intending to sink it in two fathoms of water as a
foundation for the island. Unfortunately, rough seas broke
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one of the mooring lines and the ship was dragged into deeper
waters where it eventually sank. The United States Government
has advised the businessmen that any further attempts to re-
sume construction on the bank will result in prosecution for
the creation of an obstruction to navigation. One could
argue that the use of the island as a tax free processing
plant involves rights to the natural resources, but the actual
construction of the island itself, which is what the govern-
ment was objecting to, has nothing to do with natural resources.
On November 23, 1966, a Seattle law firm, representing
the promoters of a venture to build a new island nation of
Taluga on the Cortes Bank, mailed a notice of Intent to the
Los Angeles office of the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The
notice contained twenty-three pages of text, supplementary
sketches, diagrams, charts, engineering data and financial
statements, explaining how the islands were to be built.
Taluga was to consist of four islands connected by bridges,
and would take fourteen years to construct by means of some
473,000 tons of rock carried from Mexico aboard barges at a
cost of some $13 million, and would have a total area of 97 3
acres. The Island of Taluga, Isla Nova De Edward Maria De
Sarro would be a sovereign nation and would claim a twelve
mile territorial sea. It would have friendly relations with
the United States, but it had not yet decided whether or not
it would join the United Nat ions . "2
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On November 29 , 1966, the Corps of Engineers sent a
letter to the Seattle attorneys representing the promoters,
advising them that the Cortes Bank was a part of the outer
continental shelf and that any construction on the bank would
be unlawful without a permit from the Secretary of the
133Army. J
The location of the Cortes Bank raises some serious
questions with regard to the United States' claim that it is
a part of the outer continental shelf. The bank lies some 110
miles off the California mainland and some fifty miles sea-
ward of San Clemente Island. The waters between the mainland
and San Clemente Island reach depths of 1200 meters, and the




One could argue that the deep waters are merely
"trenches" in the shelf, but the International Law Commis-
sion's Commentary on draft Article 67 states:
In the special cases in which submerged areas of a
depth of less than 200 metres, situated fairly close to
the coast, are separated from the part of the continental
shelf adjacent to the coast by a narrow channel deeper
than 200 metres, such shallow areas could be considered
as adjacent to that part of the shelf. ^5
In this case, however, the submerged areas are not
"fairly close to the coast," nor are the deep waters a
"narrow channel." The topography of the ocean floor off the
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coast of Southern California does not at all resemble a
geological continental shelf, 3 ^ and it is doubtful that 110
miles can be considered to be adjacent. Yet in December 1966,
the Department of the Interior published leasing maps showing
Cortes Bank as part of the outer continental shelf , and
subsequently granted exploratory leases in the area. ^7 Thus
it would appear that the United States actually does consider
the bank as part of the continental shelf, and was not merely
extending its jurisdiction seaward to prevent the threatened
construction of the islands.
E. Trends in Decision
The subsequent practice of the coastal states would
seem to suggest that the exploitability test has been used
to extend the area of exclusive coastal authority seaward far
beyond the limits of the continental shelf as envisioned by
the drafters of the Shelf Convention. The uncertainty created
by the existing definition of the continental shelf has led to
a number of proposals for a more precise delimitation of the
area. 138 closely related to this problem, and to some degree
inseperable from it, are the proposals for the establishment
of a legal regime for the exploration and exploitation of the
mineral resources of the deep ocean floor beyond the area of
exclusive coastal authority. It is clear that before any
regime can be established for the deep ocean. floor there must
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be a precise delimitation of the area of coastal authority,
and that the coastal states are not going to be willing to
"give up" any rights which they now have under the exploita-
bility test unless they are satisfied that their interests
will be protected under the proposed regime for the deep ocean
floor. 139
Much of the interest for the establishment of a legal
regime for the deep ocean floor has been created by the fear
of the underdeveloped nations that technology will soon make
it possible for the developed nations to exploit the resources
of the deep ocean floor. By creating an international regime
the underdeveloped nations hope to insure that they will ob-
tain some economic benefit from the exploitation of these
resources. In August 1967 , Malta introduced a proposal before
the twenty-second session of the General Assembly calling for
the consideration of a treaty to place the mineral resources
of the deep ocean floor under the jurisdiction of an inter-
national agency, with the economic benefits derived from any
exploitation to be used for the benefit of the less developed
nations . -*-40
Some writers seem to assume that because the under-
developed nations are seeking an international regime for
the deep ocean floor that they are in favor of a narrow shelf.
This is not necessarily true. At the 1958 Geneva Conference
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the vast majority of the underdeveloped nations were opposed to
the use of the 200 meters depth test to delimit the area of
exclusive coastal authority, 1^ and some of the most radical
claims to authority over the continental shelf have been made
by the underdeveloped nations. A narrow shelf would only be
advantageous to the landlocked nations and those nations in
an unfavorable geographical position , or which have no pro-
spects for mineral deposits in the submerged areas contiguous
to their coasts. What the underdeveloped nations seek to
obtain is an economic benefit from the exploitation of re-
sources beyond the area of exclusive coastal authority by
the technologically advanced nations , which they would not
obtain under existing law.
The proposals for a precise delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf are as varied as they are numerous, but they can
roughly be divided into two groups , those favoring a "wide"
shelf and those .favoring a "narrow" shelf. Recently, the
National Petroleum Council came out in favor of a wide conti-
nental shelf. The Council argued that it was in the vital
interest of the United States to retain control over the
resources of the entire "continental margin," which would in-
clude the shelf, the continental slope, and the landward
portion of the continental rise. The Council also based its
recommendation on the wording of the Shelf Convention and
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the subsequent practice of the coastal states, both of which
suggested that "the most natural and appropriate outward limit
of the country's sovereign rights" would be the natural
boundaries between the submerged continent and the oceanic
areas. ^ Lastly, the Council argued that the establishment
of a narrow shelf would result in the loss of billions of
dollars to the Federal treasury in taxes, bonuses, and
royalties
.
It seems clear, however, that the "vital interests of
the United States" and the "wording of the Shelf Convention
and the subsequent practice of the coastal states" were not
the only factors which influenced the Council's decision.
There is no evidence of any major oil deposits on the deep
ocean floor, while the prospects of rich oil deposits on the
continental slopes and rises are very promising. ^4 If the
boundary were set at some depth or distance which did not
include the slopes and rises, the petroleum industry would
lose its exclusive right to exploit the rich oil resources of
these areas. Also, it seems that the petroleum industry would
rather operate under the known perils of existing coastal
state control than under the unknown perils of international
legal-political arrangements yet to be agreed upon. ^^
The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Re-
sources, however, reached the opposite conclusion. It
recommended a "narrow" shelf:
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The seaward limit of each coastal nation's
"continental shelf" should be fixed at the 200 -meter
isobath, or 50 nautical miles from the baseline for
measuring the breadth of its territorial sea, which-
ever alternative gives it the greater area for purposes
of the Convention. 146
The Commission rejected the National Petroleum Council's
position for a number of reasons. First, the Commission felt
that the wording of the Shelf Convention and its legislative
history did not support a "wide" shelf, and that it would be
unfair to the landlocked nations. Second, there was a danger
that coastal states with little or no important resources on
their continental slopes and rises might use the claims to a
"wide" shelf for the limited purpose of mineral exploitation
as a basis for claiming exclusive authority over the superja-
cent waters, noting that Chile, Ecuador and Peru used the
Truman Proclamation as the basis for their claims to sover-
eignty over the epicontinental sea. Thus the Commission felt
that a "narrow" shelf would best serve the interests of
national security and world peace. ^7
The Commission also recognized the- need of the coastal
state to have some authority over activities adjacent to its
coast but outside the narrowly delimited continental shelf.
Thus it recommended the establishment of an "intermediate
zone," which would extend to the 2, 500 -meter isobath, or 100
nautical miles from the baseline for measuring the breadth of
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the territorial sea, whichever alternative gives the coastal
state the greater area. The coastal state would be given the
exclusive right to authorize exploration and exploitation or
mineral resources in the zone, but would not be given any
rights to the resources themselves. 4° Unfortunately, while
the Commission seems to have recognized the need of the coastal
state to exercise authority over activities which might have
a unique impact upon its important interests , the wording of
the proposal seems to limit the authority of the coastal state
to regulate activities to those involving the "utilization of
the mineral resources. 4 "
F. Appraisal and Recommendation
The North Sea Installations Act, the Triumph Reef case,
and the Cortes Bank cases might seem to suggest that the
coastal state needs a "wide" continental shelf to protect
its important interests. As previously mentioned, however,
international law already recognizes the right of the coastal
state to exercise authority over activities outside the
limits of the continental shelf which have a unique impact on
important coastal interests under the concept of the contiguous
zone, and there would be no valid reason to extend the conti-
nental shelf merely to protect these interests. This again
points up the important function of the contiguous zone
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concept. If decision-makers refuse to recognize a limited
competence of the coastal state beyond the area of exclusive
coastal authority to protect important coastal interests, then
the coastal state may feel compelled to extend the continental
shelf to protect these interests.
It should also be pointed out that the freedom of the
seas is protected, not by the exercise of jurisdiction by
some superstate or the coastal states, but by the principle
of the "flag nation," under which all activities conducted
on the high seas must be operated under the flag of some
nation, which is then responsible for and has jurisdiction
over the activities conducted under its flag. An activity
not conducted under the flag of some nation is considered to
be hostes humani generi , and subject to summary treatment . -*-50
Thus the private entrepreneur operating without the authori-
zation or protection of a flag nation would have no rights
under international law. 151- This would seem to provide a
solution to the problems created by the questionable activi-
ties of the private entrepreneurs in the above cases, if the
areas were found to be outside the limits of the coastal
states' continental shelves.
There are valid arguments on both sides of the wide-
narrow shelf controversy. Those favoring a wide shelf point
out that the coastal state would be giving away billions of
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dollars worth of potential resources vital to its security.
Those favoring a narrow shelf,. on the other hand, argue that
a "wide" shelf would be unfair to the landlocked nations
and nations in an unfavorable geological position and might
give rise to more comprehensive claims to authority over the
"wide" shelf and the superjacent waters above it.
Perhaps the real issue, however, is whether at the
present time there is any urgent need to more precisely
delimit the area of exclusive coastal authority, and whether
we have sufficient information to make a rational decision as
to the type of delimitation which would best serve the common
interests of the world community. Much of the supposed
urgency for a more precise delimitation of the continental
shelf has been the fear that technology may soon make it
possible for the developed nations of the world to exploit
the resources of the deep ocean floor, and that the uncertainty
IS ?
of the existing legal framework might lead to conflict.
The Commission on Marine Science, .Engineering and
Resources argues that the uncertainty of the existing legal
regime of the deep ocean floor could discourage exploitation,
as it does not guarantee the private entrepreneur exclusive
access to the resources of a large enough area for a long
enough time to insure any profit from the venture. ^ Like-
wise, it is not certain that the entrepreneur could prevent
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"poachers" from congregating at the site of the successful
operation, thereby avoiding the cost of initial discovery and
reducing the possibility that the venture will be entirely
unsuccessful. 1^ Similarly, the underdeveloped nations are
afraid that the existing legal regime might allow the advance
nations under the "flag nation" concept or a res nullius
theory to gain access to and control over the resources of
the deep ocean floor, thereby creating a new form of "neo-
155
colonialism." By establishing an international regime for
the deep ocean floor the underdeveloped nations hope to
derive some economic benefit from any such exploitation. All
of these proposals for a new regime for the deep ocean floor
would have to have as one of their elements the establishment
of a more precise delimitation of the continental shelf. -^
Also, some writers have criticized the "wait and see"
approach on the ground that it will allow a continued seaward
expansion of coastal authority thereby endangering the freedom
of the seas.
"
All of these arguments appear to be unsupported by
scientific evidence. At the present time all of the commercial
quantaties of offshore petroleum have been produced from wells
in waters 340 feet or less deep, and the hard mining industry
is in a state of infancy. Excluding oil and gas, there was
less than $200 million worth of mineral resources mined
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directly from the ocean floor in 1967, and if sand, gravel,
oyster shells and sulphur are excluded, the figure is reduced
to $50 million. 58 In addition, the topography of the ocean
floor creates a built in limitation on coastal expansion.
Only 8 percent of the ocean floor lies within the to 200
meter depth, and after the 200 meter line is reached the slope
of the ocean floor becomes much steeper. The next 8 percent
of the ocean floor lies within the 200 to 2000 meter depth,
and it will be quite some time before there can be any "cost
effective" exploitation at such depths. -*"
Thus there does not appear to be any immediate danger
that the exploitability criterion will enable the coastal
states to extend their jurisdiction seaward until the whole
of the ocean floor is under exclusive coastal authority.
Likewise, there does not appear to be any immediate probability
of the advanced nations exploiting the resources of the deep
ocean floor, or of the underdeveloped nations deriving any
economic benefit from the internationalization of the deep
ocean floor.
More important, however, it does not appear that we now
have the necessary information to make a rational decision as
to the type of delimitation which would best serve the common




The degree of vagueness in the exploitability criterion,
deplored by all commentators/ seems nevertheless much
less likely to produce consequential tension than would
a criterion which, while certain and precise, would also
limit coastal authority to only part of an exploitable
area and perhaps permit completely free and uncontrolled
access by others to areas beyond coastal control but
still of particular concern to the coastal state. . . .
At some point, no doubt, it will be necessary to place
a more precise limit on exclusive coastal control, . . .
but giving further concreteness to these general guides
might best await the development in economic, political,
and social conditions which are at present only vaguely
discernible, but which will be determinative of the
limits best designed to promote the common interests of
all. 160
Likewise, it is doubtful that we now have sufficient
information to determine the type of regime for the deep ocean
floor which would best serve the common interests of the
world community. The lack of information which currently
exists can be demonstrated by two recent proposals to restrict
the uses of the deep ocean floor to "peaceful purposes.'
The Malta resolution does not define the term "peaceful pur-
poses," but a recent statement by Ambassador Pardo suggests
that it would prohibit any military use of the ocean floor,
and would even prohibit scientific investigation of a mili-
tary nature. 1°^ The proposal by Senator Claiborne Pell of
Rhode Island is less restrictive than the Malta proposal,
but it would prohibit the stationing of any objects on the
ocean floor which contained "nuclear weapons or any kinds
of weapons of mass destruction."
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It would be impossible to consider all the ramifications
of these proposals, but it is suggested that none of the major
powers would be willing to give up any of their rights to use
the ocean floor for military activities without an assurance
that other states would not be able to violate the agreement.
At the present time there do not appear to be adequate de-
tection devices to insure compliance with such an agreement,
nor are there adequate sanctions which could be .applied against
a state found to be violating it. 164 ^ny agreement without
the above safeguards could destroy the existing balance of
power. In addition, it would serve no useful purpose to
prohibit military activities on the ocean floor when Polaris
and Poseidon submarines could still cruise a few feet above
the floor armed with nuclear weapons, and surface vessels
equipped with nuclear missiles could still operate on the high
seas. To be effective the prohibition would have to apply to
the whole of ocean space.
The lack of information wich now exists on the question
of the prohibition of military activities in ocean space was
expressed by Professor Bilder in an address before the Naval
War College on September 18, 1967:
Should the United States seek a rule which prevents
Soviet missile subs from approaching our own coasts even
if the rule restricted the flexibility of our own Polaris
submarines? As naval officers, do you really have




Similarly, Professor Young also comes to the conclusion
that at the present time we do not have sufficient information
to determine the type of regime for the deep ocean floor which
would best serve the common interests of all:
The conclusion to be drawn ... is that it is pru-
dent to make haste slowly. To be durable and satis-
factory, a regime for deep-sea bottom resources must be
based on a solid knowledge of geographical facts, of
technological capabilities present and anticipated, and
of political and economic realities. It is believed
that the analysis and synthesis of these elements have
not yet advanced to the stage where a decision of a
permanent character can be made with wisdom. °°
Thus it would appear that any attempt at this time to
precisely delimit the continental shelf or to establish a
juridical regime for the deep ocean floor is premature, and
that our time and energy might better be spent in trying to
analyse the factors relevant to the final solution of these
problems.

IV. THE ACCOMODATION OF THE
COMPETING INTERESTS
A. The Accomodation of Competing Interests
under the Unilateral Claims
Both the Treaty of Paria and the Truman Proclamation
specifically provided that the status of the superjacent
waters and airspace were in no way affected by the claims.
Yet it is clear that some interference with existing uses of
ocean space is necessary if the claims of the coastal states
are to have any meaning at all. Professor Lauterpacht could
see no reason why the claims of the coastal states could not
be accomodated under "the true objective of the freedom of
the seas." The freedom of the seas was intended to allow the
greatest possible use of the seas by all participants, and
only a "rigid conception of the freedom of the seas impervious
to reasonable requirements of economic life and scientific
progress" would prohibit any new use of ocean space. "'
Likewise, Dr. Mouton could see no reason why the right
of the coastal state to explore and exploit the resources of
the continental shelf could not be accomodated under the




Therefore if yet another way of using the high seas
has been discovered, we cannot reject such a use by
saying that it interferes with existing kinds of use
of the high seas. Using the high seas naturally and
logically limits the use some other person makes of it
if the place where we want to make use of the high seas
happens to be the same one chosen by somebody else. It
is also natural, that the one who can move easier, will
have to give way for the one whose kind of use of the
high seas involves a limitation in his possibilities to
move or perhaps makes any move impossible. . . . All ships
have to give, way for a fisherman laying behind his nets
or for a ship at anchor. Therefore there is nothing new
in the fact that the freedom of navigation is a "limited"
freedom, limited because other people may be. exercising
their rights on the high seas, at the same time and at
the same place. °°
Based on this enlightened view of the doctrine of the
freedom of the seas, Dr. Mouton had no difficulty in finding
that the construction of an installation for the exploitation
of the natural resources of the continental shelf was merely a
new way of exercising the right to use the high seas, "just
as much as navigation of the seas, or fishing in these seas,
or laying telegraph cables on the bottom of these seas."^"
Unfortunately, some of the subsequent unilateral
instruments made far more comprehensive claims to authority
over the continental shelf and the epicontinental sea. These
claims were far different in nature from the limited claims
to jurisdiction and control over the mineral resources of the
continental shelf. There were a number of factors which made
it in the common interest of the world community to recognize
a limited competence of the coastal state to authority over
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the mineral resources of the continental shelf: the world
wide need for oil and other mineral resources; the need for
coastal state cooperation in the complex task of drilling,
extracting, transporting, processing and storing petroleum
and other mineral resources; the danger to coastal security
posed by the presence of permanent installations near its
territorial base of power; the effect on local oil reserves
caused by the exploitation of offshore deposits which form
part of larger deposits underlying the land mass; and the
danger that with the magnitude of the investment, if exclusive
control over the area could not be guaranteed, entrepreneurs
might not be willing to undertake such a project, and the rich
oil reserves of the continental shelf, vital to the world
1 n r\
community, might not be developed. /u
The same general community interests do not exist with
regard to more comprehensive claims to the continental shelf.
If states were allowed to make comprehensive claims over vast
areas of the oceans, such as those of some of the Latin
American states, the free ocean would be reduced to a series
of disconnected lakes, and the inclusive interests of naviga-
tion, communications and fishing would be destroyed . 171 Thus
it is not in the general interest to recognize such claims.
As Professor McDougal commented:
.
./T/he claims that some our Latin American neighbors
have made to expansive territorial seas are claims of
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special interest made without regard for their
impact on others and with highly destructive conse-
quences for the total production and distribution
of goods and services. Such claims do not represent
genuine exclusive interests because they can not be made
with any promise of reciprocity. The only argument
our Latin American friends have made to justify these
claims is that if they have an extensive territorial
sea they will sell the privilege of fishing and make
money. Their changes for ultimate advantage , however,
depends upon the assumption that everything else will
remain the same. Should other states make comparable
claims, there would be complete disintegration of the
common interest and the Latin American states would
suffer inestimable loss along with everyone else. '
These unilateral claims to extensive territorial seas
are not valid under international law. In 1951, the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case stated:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an inter-
national aspect; it can not be dependent merely upon
the will of the coastal State as expressed in its muni-
cipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimita-
tion is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the
coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity
of the delimitation with regard to other states depends
upon international law. 173
When we examine existing international law we find
that the practice of coastal states are no longer uniform
with regard to the width of the territorial seas, but it
would appear that the international community does not recog-
nize claims in excess of twelve miles. '^
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B. The Accomodation of Competing Interests
under the Shelf Convention
1. Cables and Pipelines
The laying of cables and pipelines on the continental
shelf presented very few problems. The provision which the
International Law Commission ultimately recommended to the
Conference state that subject to the right of the coastal
state to take reasonable measures for the exploration and
exploitation of the continental shelf, "the coastal State
may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables
on the continental shelf ." *'-' It was understood by the Com-
mission that this would include the right of the coastal state
to impose conditions with regard to the route to be followed,
and require cables to be relocated if this became necessary
for the exploration or exploitation of the shelf. If it
became necessary to relocate cables it was understood that
the state (or the oil company) would have to pay the costs. 17 ^
With the exception of the addition, of the word "pipe-
lines" the Conference adopted the draft article as Article 4
of the Shelf Convention. While Article 4 does not mention
the right of the coastal state to regulate the route to be
followed, this would seem to be included within the "reasonable
measures" which the state can take for the exploration and
exploitation of the shelf. 177
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As far as this writer can determine there has been
little if any conflict in this area.
2. Navigation and Fishing
In 1950 the Commission declared that the rights of
navigation and fishing must not be impaired except "in so far
as strictly necessary for the exploration of seabed and sub-
soil." -*-78 In i95i the emphasis was reversed and it was
stated that the exploitation "must not result in any sub-
stantial interference with navigation and f ishing. " *•'* In
1953 the words "substantial interference" were changed to
"unjustifiable interference," and a provision was added to
1 oninclude "fish production" within this protection. ou In 1956
the words "fish production" were changed to read "conserva-
tion of living resources of the sea."^^
The Commission did not attempt to define "unjustifiable
interference," but one reason may have been that it had pro-
vided for the submission of any dispute to "the International
Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties."
Unfortunately, this provision was rejected by the Conference,
which instead substituted an Optional Protocal for the com-
pulsory settlement of disputes.
Article 5(1) of the Shelf Convention now reads:
The exploration of the continental shelf and the
exploitation of its natural resources must not result
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in any unjustifiable interference with navigation,
fishing, or the conservation of the living resources.
The Commission also sought to balance the right of the
coastal state to construct installations necessary for the
exploitation of the natural resources with the inclusive
interests of navigation and fishing. At first the Commission
seemed to consider the inclusive interests of primary impor-
tance, and prohibited the construction of installations in
184
"straits, narrow channels or on recognized sea lanes."
In 1953 the Commission narrowed the restrictions by prohibit-
ing installations only "in narrow channels or on recognized
sea lanes essential to international navigation ." ^-"^ In 1956
the restrictions were narrowed even further, and installations
were prohibited "on sea lanes essential to international
navigation" only when "interference may be caused r " 1°°
Except for the deletion of the words "narrow channels" the
Conference accepted the wording of the Commission's draft
Article 71(5) as Article 5(6) of The Shelf Convention:
Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety
zones around them, may be established where interference
may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential
to international navigation.
With regard to fishing, the installations themselves
presented no problems, but Article 5(7) of the Shelf Conven-
tion provides that the coastal state must undertake "all
appropriate measures for the protection of the living re-
sources of the sea from harmful agents."
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The Shelf Convention also contains other provisions
with respect to the rights and duties of the coastal state
with regard to the construction of installations. Article
5(3) provides that the coastal state may establish safety
zones around these installations up to a maximum of 500
meters, and that all ships must respect these zones. Article
5 (4) provides that the installations shall not have the status
of an island, nor shall they have a territorial sea of their
own. Finally, Article 5(5) provides that due notice of the
construction of any installation must be given, that permanent
means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained,




In 1956 the Commission tried to relieve the fears of
the scientific community that the rights of the coastal state
to explore and exploit the continental shelf might restrict
scientific research in the shelf area:
The proposals made by the Commission in its report
for 1953 /that the coastal state exercises sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the
resources of the continental shelf7 caused some anxiety
in scientific circles, where it was thought that freedom
to conduct scientific research in the soil of the conti-
nental shelf and in the waters above would be endangered.
In so far as such research are conducted in the waters
above a continental shelf, this anxiety seems to be
unjustified since the freedom to conduct research in '
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these waters—which still form part of the high seas
—
is in no way affected. The coastal State will not have
the right to prohibit scientific research, in parti-
cular research on the conservation of the living re-
sources of the sea. The consent of the State will only
be required for research relating to the exploration or
exploitation of the seabed or subsoil. It is to be
expected that the coastal State will only refuse its
consent exceptionally, and in cases in which it fears
an impediment to its exclusive rights to explore and
exploit the seabed and subsoil. 187
At the Conference the Fourth Committee adopted a pro-
posal by Denmark which provided that the rights of the
coastal state must not interfere with fundamental oceano-
graphic or other scientific research "carried out with the
intention of open publication. " 188 This proposal was in-
corporated into Article 5(1) of the Shelf Convention. Un-
fortunately, the meaning of the provision became confused
when the Committee also adopted a French proposal which
required the coastal state's consent for any research "into
the soil or subsoil of the continental shelf ." 189 The
Drafting Committee of the Conference, in considering the
articles on the continental shelf, replaced the just quoted
words with the following: "concerning the continental shelf
and undertaken there. "190 ^he proposal with the changes
made by the Drafting Committee was adopted by the Plenary
Session and became Article 5 (8)
:
The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained
in respect of any research concerning the continental
shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless the coastal

77
State shall not normally withhold its consent if the
request is submitted by a qualified institution with a
view to purely scientific research into the physical
or biological characteristics of the continental shelf,
subject to the proviso that the coastal State shall have
the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be
represented in the research, and that in any event the
results shall be published.
The wording of this article raises some very serious
problems. It is obvious from the original wording of the
article that it was only intended to apply to research involv-
ing physical contact with the subsoil and seabed and not to
research conducted in the superjacent waters. Also, the real
purpose of the article was to prevent exploitation of the
shelf for commercial reasons under the guise of scientific
research. ^ Yet, as will be shown later, it is not certain
that all states will so interpret the article.
Another problem is created by the use of the term
"qualified institution." Because of the large amount of
capital required for scientific investigation, and the lack
of return on the investment, most of the purely scientific
research is being conducted by the nation state, and in this
country much of the oceanographic research is being conducted
by the Office of Naval Research, with the use of military
personnel . -^^^ Would this be considered a "qualified in-
stitution?"
There are at least two precedents holding that scientif-
ic research of a peaceful nature can be conducted with
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military personnel. Article .1 of the Antartic Treaty states
that "Antartica shall be used for peaceful purposes only,"
but that nothing "shall prevent the use of military personnel
or equipment for scientific research."-'-^ In fact, much of
the scientific research in Antartica has been conducted by
military personnel. Likewise, Article IV of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon .and Other
Celestial Bodies, provides that the "use of military personnel
for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes
shall not be prohibited." 194 -j- t win be remembered that all
of our early astronauts were military personnel. Thus there
does not appear to be any reason why the Office of Naval
Research should not be considered a "qualified institution."
Similarly, if the words "purely scientific research"
were strictly construed, much valuable scientific research
might be prohibited, as nearly any scientific discovery might
possibly have a military application. *-" .
At least part of the problem might be solved if some
international agency were allowed to conduct most of the
scientific research involving the continental shelves. In
our tension filled world, national decision-makers are all
to aware of the potential abuse and misuse of scientific
projects conducted by other nations near their territorial
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bases of power. Also, as Professor Burke points out,
industry is not likely to share its hard won secrets with
potential competitors , nor is the nation-state likely to
publish information which might have a military application.
Thus there would appear to be far less chance of conflict and
a much better chance of dissemination of information and the
prevention of duplication by the use of an international agency
to conduct scientific research on the continental shelf.
C. Subsequent Practice of the Coastal States
The coastal state's limited right to use the shelf for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources
has resulted in substantial interference with the more tradi-
tional uses of ocean space. While Article 5(1) of the Shelf
Convention provides that the right of the coastal state shall
not "result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation,"
the existence of over 2000 oil installations in the Gulf of
Mexico has led to the establishment of shipping "Safety Fair-
ways and Anchorage Areas."' While vessels are not required
to use these lanes, it would appear that in the event of a
collision between a vessel and an installation outside a
fairway, that the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation
would consider the operation of the vessel outside the fair-
way as a presumption of negligence.
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While the installations themselves do not represent
any threat to fisheries , except in so far as the installations
might present a navigational hazard to fishing vessels, the
real threat to fisheries lies in the danger of pollution of
the waters from leaks. The recent leak of a Union Oil Company
well in the Santa Barbara Channel in January of this year
points up the potential danger of erecting oil wells in fault
areas.-*-™ The oil well leaked some 21,000 gallions of oil a
day into the Santa Barbara Channel for twelve days before the
leak was sealed, and turned the area into a "dead sea." It
is estimated that it will be years before the ecology of the
area fully recovers. 200
Likewise, scientific investigation has been greatly
restricted by the requirement of Article 5 (8) that the con-
sent of the coastal state be obtained for any research con-
cerning the continental shelf. The difficulty in obtaining
the consent of the coastal state has already thwarted several
scientific projects. While it has been suggested that
Article 5 (8) should only apply to research involving actual
physical contact with the subsoil and seabed, it is not cer-
tain that all states will so interpret the article. Recently,
several Russian scholars stated that "physical and biological
phenomena occurring in waters superjacent to the continental
shelf may not be correctly understood and analyzed without
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simultaneously researching these phenomena on the seabed. 202
Under this interpretation, any research involving the super-
jacent waters would require the consent of the coastal state.
Since the limited right to explore and exploit the
resources of the continental shelf has already restricted the
inclusive interests in the shelf area, what right, if any,
does the coastal state have to further restrict these interests
by using the shelf for purposes unrelated to the exploration
or exploitation of natural resources? Some writers seem to
assume that the coastal state exercises "sovereignty" over
the continental shelf, and that any use of the shelf would be
permissible. Thus Stang, while admitting that at the present
time the United States has only authorized the use of the
outer continental shelf for the exploration and exploitation
of mineral resources, states:
Nor is the person /using the shelf for purpose
unrelated to the exploration or exploitation of mineral
resources7 protected from potentially competing users of
the Shelf, e.g., a foreign submarine skipper, oceano-
grapher, or fisherman who wants to exercise his respective
high seas freedom, such as the freedom of operation in
the water column over the Shelf. . . . But if the "third
person" has a lease or other statutory authorized per-
mission from the U.S. Government for the Shelf area
concerned, he would be protected from such interference . 203
This statement appears to suggest that any use of the
shelf which is "authorized" would be permissible, and that
under no circumstances would an inclusive interest ever be
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permitted to limit or restrict such an authorized use. There
are no criteria set down for determining the priorities of
the competing interests.
Professors McDougal and Burke are also willing to admit
that the coastat state has interests in the continental shelf
which are unrelated to exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources, but they are not willing to disregard the
inclusive interests of the world community. Thus, while
admitting that the coastal state does have other interests in
the continental shelf, they add a caveat ;
These conclusions are not equivalent, of course, to
suggesting that all possible uses of the continental
shelf by the coastal state must be considered equally
permissible and that all possible uses by the non-
coastal states are impermissible. It is one thing to
confer upon the coastal state sovereign rights to ex-
plore and exploit the continental shelf for its natural
resources, with appropriate limitations to secure that
the exercise of these rights is compatable with inclusive
uses, and something else again to regard any use of the
continental shelf as sufficiently important to merit
limitations on navigation and fishing /and other in-
clusive uses7. . . . Whether or not other uses are reason-
able, however, would depend ... on their reasonableness
in terms of the importance of the local interests at
stake, the significance of the more inclusive interests
affected, and the compatability of the use proposed with
inclusive uses. ^
Thus Professors McDougal and Burke realize that the
true function of the law of the sea is the protecting and
balancing of all common interests, both inclusive and exclusive,
and that both sets of interests must be considered in the
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discussion of any proposed use of the continental shelf.
Thus a methodology is needed which will consider the impact
of the proposed use on both sets of interests in determining
its reasonableness. It is suggested that the same factors
relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of activ-
ities involving the exploration for and exploitation of the
natural resources of the continental shelf are equally deter-
minative with regard to the reasonableness of other proposed
uses of the shelf which were neither considered nor provided
for by the Shelf Convention. ° 5
D. A Methodology for the Accomodation of
the Competing Interests
1. Basic Community Policies Relevant to
the Public Order of the Oceans
Before examining the problem of the accomodation of
the competing uses under the doctrine of the continental
shelf, it is necessary to first determine the basic community
policies relevant to the public order of the oceans.
Traditionally the function of the law of the sea has
been that of protecting and balancing the common interests of
the world community, both inclusive and exclusive, while at
the same time rejecting those assertions of special interests
which are not in keeping with these common interests. ^°
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While an exclusive interest is a claim or demand by a
single state to exclusive control or authority over an area
or activity which the claimant can not share with others, it
is, nevertheless, protected as a common interest because it
is an interest with respect to which other states share a
common concern. For example, all states are concerned with
the security of their territorial base of power, and, therefore,
each state in its own interest recognizes the right of the
coastal state to claim a narrow belt of adjacent waters as
a "territorial sea," and to exercise exclusive authority
over the area. Likewise, it soon became evident that an
occassional exercise of authority over activities beyond this
belt which have a unique impact upon important coastal in-
terests had to be honored if the common interests of all
states to the security of their land masses were to be pro-
tected. Therefore, while an exclusive interests is a claim
by a single state to jurisdiction or control over an area or
activity, it is in the interest of all st-ates to recognize
the claim, as each state can make a similar claim in its own
right under the doctrine of reciprocity . ^07
A special interest, however, is a claim which is
disruptive in its impact upon others, and which bears no
rational relationship to a genuine exclusive interest which
can be made with the promise of reciprocity. For example, if
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a state claimed a 200 mile territorial sea, such a claim
would be highly disruptive of the inclusive interests of the
other states. If other states made similar claims then the
free ocean would be reduced to a series of disconnected lakes
and the general interests of navigation, communications, and
fishing would be distroyed. If this happened, the inclusive
interests of the claimant would be destroyed along with
those of the other members of the world community. Thus it
is a claim which will operate to the benefit of the claimant
only if other states do not make similar claims, and, there-
208fore, can not be made with the promise of reciprocity.
The exclusive interests of the coastal state are often
expressed by such labels as "internal waters," "territorial
sea," "contiguous zones," and "continental shelf," often
lumped together under the very broad concept of "security."
Likewise, the inclusive interests of the world community are
often expressed by such concepts as "innocent passage,"
"freedom of navigation and fishing," "freedom of cable -laying,"
and "freedom of flight," often grouped together under the
doctrine of the "freedom of the seas." °^
These highly abstract and contradictory concepts,
however, are of little value to the decision maker in re-
solving the problem of the accomodation of the competing
interests, unless he understands the purpose which these in-
herited prescriptions were intended to serve.
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Under the process of interaction, virtually all the
actors in the world social process seek to make use of the
oceans for a variety of purposes. The objectives which they
seek to obtain involves the promotion and protection of the
entire value process. It is not too surprising, therefore,
that the objectives of different participants may conflict.
The conflict may arise within a single type of use, such as
two vessels seeking to use the same ocean space at the same
time, or between different uses, such as a claim by one state
to temporary exclusive access to and control over an area of
the high seas for weapons testing, thereby restricting navi-
gation and fishing in the immediate area. xw
One of the factors relevant in this process of inter-
action is the geographic location of the interaction of
interests in relation to the land masses. As the interaction
moves towards the coastal state's territorial base of power
the higher becomes the degree of concentration of exclusive
interests which the coastal state may have in the area. Con-
versely, as the interaction moves away from the land mass, the
more pronounced become the inclusive interests of the world
community . ^ 11
Because of the high degree of concentration of exclusive
interests in the waters immediately adjacent to the land masses,
and the probability of activities in these areas having an
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impact upon important coastal interests, the coastal states
make their most comprehensive claims to authority over these
waters under the label of "internal waters." The degree of
authority exercised by the coastal states over the internal
waters is the same as that exercised by them over their
territorial bases of power. The authority claimed over the
next adjacent waters under the label of "territorial sea" is
only slightly less comprehensive, and the inclusive right of
"innocent passage" is the only recognized exception to the
coastal states' soverignty over these waters. ^
In the contiguous high seas the coastal states make
limited claims to authority over activities which have a
unique impact upon important coastal interests. These claims
have been made under such labels as "contiguous zones,"
"fisheries zones," "custom zones," "defensive areas," and
"continental shelf." Other participants have made opposing
claims under such labels as "freedom of navigation and fish-
ing," "freedom of scientific investigation/' and the very
broad concept of "freedom of the seas."
Recently some decision-makers have attempted to
rigidly restrict the rights of the coastal states in these
contiguous high seas areas. This "international myopia"
places too much emphasis on the inclusive interests under an
absolutistic conception of the doctrine of the freedom of
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the seas, and ignores the complementary half of the law of
the sea which protects the exclusive interests of the coastal
states. Some coastal states, on the other hand, have made
comprehensive claims over wide belts of adjacent waters by-
means of unilaterial extensions of their territorial seas.
This form of "provincial myopia" ignores the inclusive in-
terests of the world community. -^
Since the continental shelf is adjacent to the coastal
state but outside the territorial sea, the function of the
decision-maker becomes one of protecting and balancing both
sets of common interests. To aid the dec is ion -maker in this
highly complex task, Professors McDougal and Burke list some
of the factors which the decision -maker should consider in
protecting and balancing these competing sets of interests:
The task which confronts a decision-maker in a
particular controversy is, accordingly, not that of
automatically applying inherited prescriptions but of
giving such prescriptions a new operational meaning by
weighing all the different factors and policies which
are significant in the context before him. ... It
includes such items as the interests sought to be pro-
tected by the claims, the relative location and extent
of the ocean area affected, the extent of authority or
immunity claimed, the activities subjected to authority
or affected by it, the degree and duration of inter-
ference with existing uses, the historical factors in-
volved such as custom and priority in usage, the rela-
tionship between the authority or immunity claimed and
the interests sought to be protected, and the significance
of all the interests affected, exclusive and inclusive,
to all the participants, including the whole community
as well as the claimants. 15
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2. Community Policies Relevant to
the Accomodation of the Competing Interests
under the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf
As previously mentioned, it was a series of factors
which made it in the common interests of the world community
to recognize the exclusive authority of the coastal state over
the natural resources of the continental shelf. Likewise , all
the unilateral claims to the resources of the continental
shelf recognized some inclusive interests in the shelf area,
although the degree of recognition varied according to the
nature and extent of the claim. The Truman Proclamation, for
example, which made only a limited claim to the mineral
resources of the continental shelf, recognized the complete
freedom of superjacent waters and airspace. Other states,
however, made far more comprehensive claims to the continental
shelf, and as a result were much more disruptive in their im-
pact on the inclusive interests of the world community. Chile,
Ecuador and Peru, for example, by a tripartite agreement
signed at Santiago, Chile, on August 18, 1952, extended their
sovereignty over a zone extending 200 nautical miles seaward
from their coasts to "ensure the conservation and protection
of its natural resources." The only inclusive right recognized
by the agreement was "the innocent and inoffensive passage of
vessels of all nations through the zone. "216
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The Shelf Convention rejected these comprehensive
claims to authority over the continental shelf and epiconti-
nental sea, and instead recognized a limited exclusive right
of the coastal state to explore the shelf and to exploit its
natural resources. The Shelf Convention attempted to balance
the exclusive rights of the coastal state with the inclusive
interests of the world community by providing in Article 5(1)
that the exclusive right to explore the continental shelf and
to exploit its natural resources "must not result in any un-
justificable interference with navigation, fishing or the
conservation of the living resources ... or result in any
interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific
research carried out with the intention' of open publication."
Unfortunately, "unjustifiable interference" was not defined.
It would seem, therefore, that a methodology must be estab-
lished to determine the reasonableness of a particular use of
the shelf in the event of a conflict between these two sets
of interests.
With regard to the need to balance the exclusive right
of the coastal state to explore and exploit the shelf with
the inclusive right of navigation, Dr. Mouton makes the
following critical observation:
Much depends of course on the place where the in-
stallation is erected. This factor plays a more serious
role if a number of these installations are going to
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be built in the same area. For a "cluster" of these
installations the answer to the question, whether they
constitute a hinderence for shipping largely depends
on the location, and of course the distance between them
If located somewhere in a bay or gulf, not frequented
by shipping we can safely say that no practicle obstical
exists. . . . It is, however, quite clear that if oil
companies were left free in putting their constructions
wherever they wanted, irrespective of other interests, a
serious obstruction of shipping may arise, for instance
in narrow passages, straits frequented by shipping or
approaches to harbors. ^'
It was just such a problem that led to the creation
of "Safety Fairways" in the Gulf of Mexico. An official
survey conducted in 1964 showed that there were some 1,783
permanent oil installations in the Gulf, 1,590 of which were
located in or near shipping lanes. Also, it was reported
that shipmasters were unable to find the key sea buoy at the
entrance of the channel to the Port of New Orleans because
2 18it was hidden by an oil installation.
Similarly, the North Sea presents another arena of
potential conflict. It is the source of one of the world's
richest fisheries, vital to the inhabitants of the surround-
ing states. Also, it is an important trade route for the
densely populated and highly industrialized nations which
surround it. Some 750 ships a day pass through the Straits
of Dover, and Rotterdam is the world's leading seaport. In
addition to the heavy volumn of traffic, the problem is
further complicated by the frequency of bad weather. ^
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The existence of such important inclusive interests might
outweigh or require limitations on the rights of the coastal
states to explore and exploit the shelf of the North Sea.
As previously mentioned, the existence of installations
in and of itself does not present any conflict with the in-
clusive right of fishing. In fact, in the eight years
following the major expansion of oil activities in the Gulf
p Of)
of Mexico in 1957, the fish catch in the area doubled.
The real danger to the living resources of the sea lies in
the possibility of harmful agents, such as oil, being intro-
duced into the sea from leaks in the installation. Thus it
would seem that the coastal state must insure that adequate
regulations are provided to protect the living resources.
There does not appear to be any problem with the
accomodation of scientific research, other than the fear of
the coastal state that the activity might be used as a cover
for exploitation or espionage. It is suggested, however,
that the right of the coastal state under Article 5(8) of the
Shelf Convention to take part in the activity provides an
adequate safeguard to insure that the privilege will not be
abused. ^21 Also, there is no reason why much of this re-
search could not be conducted by some international agency
such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (OIC)






Thus it would appear that there are a number of factors
relevant to the problem of protecting and balancing both sets
of competing interests. Among the factors relevant in
determining whether an activity involving the exploration of
the continental shelf or the exploitation of its natural
resources "unreasonably" or "unjustifiably" interferes with
inclusive interests would be the location of the activity
and the importance of the existing inclusive interests in
the area, the degree to which the activity will interfere with
the existing uses, and alternative modalities of accomodation,
such as the establishment of "safety fairways" or regulations
as to the number of installations or the distances between
them.
It is suggested that these same factors would be rele-
vant to the accomodation of the emerging uses of the continen-
tal shelf. Any new use of the continental shelf proposed
by the coastal state must be considered in the context of its
impact on the inclusive interests of the world community, and,
conversely, any proposed use of the shelf by other states
must be considered in the context of its impact upon important
coastal interests.
While navigation, fishing, cable-laying and scientific
inquiry have only a casual impact on coastal interests, other
uses might endanger the security of the coastal state. Thus
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the same factors which made it in the common interest of the
world community to recognize the exclusive right of the
coastal state to explore and exploit the natural resources
of the continental shelf, might also make it in the common
interest to grant the coastal state the authority to prohibit
other states from constructing military installations on its
continental shelf. 2 ^ -p deny a limited competence of the
coastal state to prohibit certain activities which have a
unique impact on important coastal interests might result in
the coastal state asserting a comprehensive claim to authority
over the continental shelf as witnessed by the North Sea
Installations Act.
Similarly, there is no valid reason why the coastal
state should not be permitted to use the continental shelf
for other purposes, so long as the proposed use does not
unreasonably interfere with inclusive uses. If the coastal
state constructed a military installation on the shelf in such
a way that it was not placed in an important sea lane or
fisheries area, it would be easy enough for vessels to avoid
the installation and any reasonably sized safety zone estab-
lished to protect it, and it would not be unreasonable to
require that cables and pipelines be routed around the
installation and its protective zone.
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It would be impossible to consider all the new uses of
the ocean floor made possible by modern technology or to pre-
dict what new uses might become possible in the near future.
It is certain, however, that if conflict is to be avoided,
the decision maker must attempt to accomodate these emerging
uses, and, when conflicts do arise between the emerging use
and existing uses, he must weigh and balance all factors
relevant to the particular controversy in determining the
reasonableness of the proposed use. Among the factors relevant
to this determination would be the number and importance of
the participants, the size of the area affected and the dura-
tion of the proposed use, the importance of the interests
sought to be acquired or protected, the importance of the
existing uses and the degree to which they can be accomodated
with the proposed use, alternative modalities for accomplish-
ing the same objectives, and the significance of all interests
affected, not only to the immediate participants, but to the
other members of the world community as well.
This task is not an easy one, but no other alternative
solution seems to be available. The coastal states will not
be willing to accept a solution which unduely restricts their
rights to develop the adjacent submarine areas, and which
fails to recognize their right to protect their important
coastal interests. Likewise, the world community will not be
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willing to accept a solution which grants the coastal states
a comprehensive competence over their continental shelves,
thereby endangering all of the inclusive interests. If the
public order of the oceans is to be maintained, then both
sets of interests must be protected. Neither absolute sover-
eignty nor a rigid conception of the doctrine of the freedom
of the seas serves this function.

V. THE ACCOMODATION OF THE EMERGING USES UNDER
THE EXISTING LAW OF THE SEA
Now that we have examined the emerging uses under the
doctrine of the continental shelf, it might be useful to
briefly examine the emerging uses under other aspects of the
law of the sea.
Recently the Oceanographic Commission of the State of
Washington sponsored a project by the University of Washing-
ton, Honeywell, Inc., and the Battelle Memorial Institute, to
study the feasibility of constructing a permanent scientific
installation on the Cobb Seamount, which is located in the
Pacific some 270 miles west of the State of Washington- The
mount rises from a 9000 foot base to within 122 feet of the
surface. The summit is flat and contains an area of approxi-
mately twenty acres. This summer the project intends to
erect a manned habitat on the summit as the first step to
the construction of a permanent scientific installation.
The Naval Underwater Warfare Center has also made preliminary
studies of the Cobb Seamount as a possible site for a manned
underwater operational support bas— *"*"*
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At the present time the juridical status of the deep
ocean floor is not clear. Some writers argue that the deep
ocean floor is a res nullius / subject to national appropria-
tion by "effective occupation." These writers argue that
the Shelf Convention offers ample proof that the status of
the ocean floor can be juridically separated from that of the
superjacent waters, and that the isolated claims of England
to ownership of pear and chank fisheries off the coasts of
Celyon and Bahrein, and those of the Bey of Tunis to sponge
beds under areas of the high seas provide further evidence
that the deep ocean floor is subject to national appropria-
tion. ^ J Other writers, however, argue that the deep ocean
floor is res communis , the property of everyone, and not
subject to national appropriation by any state. They point
out that the Shelf Convention rejected the theory that the
continental shelf was a res nullius , and only granted the
coastal states limited rights to explore and exploit the
shelf. Also, they point out that the ocean floor can not be
effectively occupied in the same manner as land territory
and that to reduce the term to a meaningless phase would
raise the danger of "paper claims" being made to vast areas
of the ocean floor. 22"
Even under the res communis theory, however, writers
agree that temporary claims to exclusive control over areas
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of the high seas are permissible so long as they do not
unreasonably interfere with the inclusive uses of the areas'^
In the past, states have made limited claims to temporary
exclusive access to and use of areas of the high seas for
purposes such as naval maneuvers, weapons testing, and rocket
and missile experimentation, but the areas involved were more
or less isolated from intensive community interests. 28 Yet
some interference with inclusive interests has occurred.
For example, in July 1961, the Soviet Union stopped and
redirected several foreign merchant vessels in the Baltic
Sea because of gunnery practice by the Soviet Baltic Fleet
in the area. 2 ^9
The real issue in the Cobb Seamount case is whether or
not it is in the common interests of the United States and
the world community for the United States to make a compre-
hensive claim to exclusive authority over the area. In the
opinion of this writer, it is not.
The opinions of writers on the juridical status of
the deep ocean floor are of limited importance, as they do
not represent the practice of states, and, since there is
no practice of states in this regard, there have not been
any expectations created. The United States is now in a
position to strongly influence the future practice of states
with regard to claims to the deep ocean floor by the prece-
dent which it now establishes.
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To claim a comprehensive competence over an area of
the deep ocean floor under a label such as "sovereignty/ 1
would encourage others to do likewise. While existing
technology does not now make it possible for man to use the
ocean floor except in relatively shallow areas, there are
some 1400 known seamounts in the Pacific, and it is estimated
that this is only ten percent of the actual number existing
in that basin alone. 230 Thus it is quite possible that the
technologically advanced nations will soon be able to use
areas of the ocean floor beyond the limits of the continental
shelf. Comprehensive claims to areas of the ocean floor
beneath the high seas might well affect the status of the
superjacent waters and destroy the freedom of the seas which
has served the common interests of mankind so well.
Instead, it would seem that the United States would be
far better off to claim a temporary exclusive use of the area
under the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. From what
this writer has been able to discover, it does not appear
that the Cobb Seamount is an area of intensive community
interests, and that the use of the seamount by the United
States would not unreasonably interfere with important
community interests. If the United States based its claim
to temporary use of the seamount on the doctrine of the
freedom of the seas it would then be able to consider the
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legality of other claims under the policies relevant to the
freedom of the seas. Such factors as the location of the
area, the size of the area involved, the comprehensiveness
and duration of the claim, the importance of existing uses
of the area, , and the ability to accomodate the existing uses
with the authority claimed would all be relevant in deter-
mining the validity of the claim.
Similarly, the methodology might be useful for solving
the problem of the emerging uses of the water column. Science
has already proven that fishery yields can be greatly in-
creased by scientific methods. 2 ^1 Efforts are now being made
to eliminate the waste created by the long food chain from
phytoplankton to zooplankton to fish, by harvesting zooplankton
which feed directly on the phytoplankton. Also, attempts are
being made to use remote areas of the ocean, which, because
of the depth of the water and the lack of currents, have very
little natural life. The plan is to introduce life into the
area, and to keep the life cycle going by means of artificial
232
upwelling. Aquaculture may well provide the answer to
the world's food problem. Unfortunately, at the present time
the law of the sea does not protect aquaculture beyond the
territorial waters of the coastal state, and the freedom of
fishing seems to grant all states the right of free access
to fisheries regardless of any efforts to improve the yield
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made by any of the participants. Perhaps the importance of
the activity in relation to the growing food problem would
justify some interference with existing uses of the high
seas. Again, the solution of the problem is not that of
automatically applying some pre-existing prescription such as
the "freedom of fishing," but rather that of analyzing all
the factors relevant to the particular controversy. In this
case it would seem that aquaculture should not be permitted
in important sea lanes or in already existing fisheries
areas, as the pre-existing uses of the area would have
created reasonable expectations on the part of the partici-
pants, and the importance of the existing uses would out-
weigh the importance of the proposed use. On the other hand,
the use of some remote area of the high seas with little or
no existing interests would not be .unreasonable . If the area
is not extensively navigated or has no important natural
fisheries then no expectations have been created. It is also
suggested that the great importance of food resources to the
world community might outweigh some interference with existing
uses
.
Thus we can see that the real solution to the problem
of the accomodation of the emerging uses is a proper under-
standing of the true function of the law of the sea, the
protecting and balancing of all the common interests, both
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exclusive and inclusive, and the widest possible sharing of
values among the peoples of the world. The coastal state must
be willing to limit its claims to those necessary for the
protection of its important coastal interests, and the world
community must be willing to recognize the right of the
coastal state to protect these interests, while at the same
time seeking the widest possible accomodation of uses by the
participants of ocean space. Each participant must in turn
seek to serve the common interests of all. The law of the
sea must be flexible enough to accomodate the continuously
emerging uses made possible by advances in technology. No
other rational solution exists. The failure to accomodate
the common interests of the world community, both inclusive
and exclusive, will result in a breakdown of the existing
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